Musa MARJANLI

ARMENIANS.
RUSSIA. THE CAUCASUS

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The present book by M. Marjanli dwells upon the relationships Armenians have had with autochthonous peoples and Russia in the South Caucasus after being resettled to this region, and the attempts by Armenian migrants to Armenianize territories and ethnicities. The existence of a total of 26 “Armenias” confirms the planned nature of the Armenians’ eastward advance: from their ancestral homeland in the Balkans, i.e. Europe, to Asia Minor and further southwards. Therefore, Armenian scholars never talk of the history of Armenia proper, but of the Armenian people.
The book is meant for historians and experts in international relations, as well as a broad readership.
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Introduction

Ilia Chavchavadze

The Armenians, who have covered a centuries-long thorny road from Europe to Asia Minor, including the Caucasus, have always attempted to ‘Armenianize’ the territories, states, tribes and ethnic groups along the way. Such were their actions during the Roman and Byzantine Empires, the Arabic caliphate, the Seljuk and Mongol states, the Persian and Ottoman Empires. This is confirmed by the fact that there are now 26 “Armenias” by which one can actually trace the Armenians’ eastward advance: from the Balkans, i.e. from Europe, to Asia Minor and further to the East.

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No matter whether we had much or little, we provided you with a shelter and treated you like brothers. So don’t treat us like enemies in our own home! It is better to have a lion sitting in your way than an enemy in your home. Georgians used to say so long ago, so do we and so will any reasonable Armenian.

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As a matter of fact, a prominent representative of the Silver Age of Russian poetry and founder of Russian Symbolism, Valery Bryusov, added a 27th Georgian Armenia to the list.

Therefore, Armenian scholars talk not so much about the history of Armenia but rather about the history of the Armenian people. Even Moses Khorenatsi, “the father of Armenian history” who lived in the 5th century, wrote the “History of the Armenians” (“Hayots Patmut’yun”)\(^2\), not the history of Armenia. His research dwells upon the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Greek Armenias\(^3\). Two centuries later, in the 7th century, Anania Shirakaci also pointed to a number of ‘Armenias’ in his “Ashharacuic” (“Geography”): First, Second, Third, Fourth, Minor, Great, High Armenias and Persarmenia\(^4\). Given the number of “Armenias”, it is quite typical of this people to attempt to revive Armenian statehood in places where it has been lost four times at different periods in history. Thus, the Kingdoms of Van, Vaspurakan, Kars and Ani, and the state of Cilicia were located in Asia Minor, but the First, Second and Third Armenian Republics were proclaimed on Azerbaycan ter

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1 Bryusov V., Chronicle of historical destinies of the Armenian people. M., 1918. Ch. IX.
ritories, in the historical region of Chukhur-Saad⁵.

To confirm the above, suffice it to refer to the work of a western expert on Armenia, D. Lang, who writes: “Greek author Strabo links Armenians to Thessaly, a region in the North of Greece. He adds that a resident of Thessaly Armenus visited the country together with Argonaut Jason and friends and named it after himself. As to Phrygians, Strabo claims that they are of Thracian origin and had come to Asia Minor from what is now Bulgaria after the Trojan War. This semi-legendary information is quite interesting as it enables us to link Armenian ancestors to the mysterious “people of the Sea” who waged wars in Asia Minor in 1200 B.C.’”⁶.

However, Armenians’ attempts to settle down on a certain territory and establish their own statehood remained futile for a long time. As is the case today, they were always an ethnic minority⁷. They could always have a certain impact on the situation in the host country, but never change their own status dramatically.

The Armenians’ last hope in this regard was associated with Russia and the Caucasus. What this has resulted in is well-known from the history of the Caucasus and the peoples living there. It is also well-known from the diverse relations of the Armenian people with its neighbors in different spheres, different levels of political, confessional, cultural, socioeconomic and ethnic life.

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ARMENIANS AND RUSSIA

Early information about Armenians in Russia dates back to the 13th century when Prince Daniel Romanovych (1238-1264) of Galicia and Volhynia invited the Armenians to his lands. This is when first Armenian colonies appeared in Western Ukraine, which happens to be the home of Simeon Lehaci, 17th century Armenian author who described, in his Traveler Notes, a problem-free and happy life of his fellow tribesmen in the Ottoman Empire. During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich (1645-1676), new waves of Armenians emerged in Russia, but it was Peter the Great (1682-1725) who helped the Armenians settle down in Russia the most and gave them different advantages. Thus, after seizing the Caspian coast in 1722, he attempted to settle the Muslim-populated territories of Dagestan and Azerbaijan with Christians. With this aim, Peter the Great ordered his envoy to Istanbul A. Rumyantsev to talk Armenians of the Ottoman Empire into moving to a newly-established Caspian region of the Russian Empire that covered the seaside territories of Azerbaijan from Derbent in the north to Rasht in the south. The Armenians were promised that local people “will be deported and the territories given to the Armenians”.

This is how Azerbaijan was used in starting the process of “Armenianization” of the Caucasus. Peter the Great wanted to resettle Ottoman Armenians first because most Armenians lived in the territories of the Ottoman sultan; second, the Ottoman Empire

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was Russia’s main rival in the struggle for the Caucasus; third, Ottoman Armenians who knew Russia’s rival from within might prove useful in helping to learn the enemy better; fourth, these Armenians could play the role of “a fifth column” in the enemy camp; fifth, by resettling the Armenians, Peter the Great was also increasing the Christian population of the Caucasus that would eventually support him in the local Muslim environment.

The policies of Peter the Great in the Caucasus were continued by Ekaterina II (1762-1796), who “expressed a desire to restore the Armenian kingdom under the patronage of Russia”11. This plan was meant to strengthen the Christian element in the Caucasus by means of the Armenian satellite factor which was to be used in Russian geopolitics in the south. This tactic was part of a strategy designed to gain a foothold in Derbent, occupy Shamakhi and Ganja, and then, with enough troops, seize Erivan from Karabakh and Sygnakh”12. Thus, the plan was to realize a strategic mission in the Caucasus at the expense of Azerbaijan.

However, Russia did not intend to establish an “Armenian state” where there had never been Armenian statehood. This is why the well-known Russian expert on the Caucasus, political analyst and journalist, V. Velichko, wrote in the early 20th century that one of Empress Ekaterina’s favorites, “a brilliant prince of Taurida”, G. A. Potemkin, was a man of great imagination. He was fascinated with the idea of reviving a Christian kingdom in “the Armenian plain”13. The revival could take place, for Ekaterina II “was extremely kind to Armenians, which could be explained by moral corruption and excessive luxury during her reign”14. Judging by the fact that grateful Armenians of Nakhchivan-on-Don (near Rostov-on-Don) erected a monument to Ekaterina II, one can

11 A. Anninsky. History of Armenian Church (until the 19th century). S. Petersburg, 1889. P.305.
13 V. Velichko. The Caucasus. The Russian affair and inter-tribal points. S. Petersburg, 1904. P.77
14 Ditto.
agree that she was quite well-disposed to these aliens. It should be mentioned that in Soviet times the monument was knocked down, but local Armenians restored it in post-Soviet years.

The Armenians enjoyed favorable treatment also during the reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) who issued a “high resolution” to a petition requesting to settle Armenians near Derbent. Thus, a document from 21 December 1802 evidenced “the rights and privileges that his ancestors had granted to the Armenian people”\(^\text{15}\).

In the 19\(^{th}\) century, the Russian Empire was the actual master in the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, which is why it gained access to the Straits and the Mediterranean. In the same century it seized the Caucasus and the Crimea, and was giving orders in the Balkans. Therefore, V. Velichko thought it appropriate to indicate, with reference to the Ottoman Armenians, that “A hope for the revival of the Armenian people and state runs like a barely noticeable thread through the history of the Armenian people, full of humiliation at the hands of great and small kings of other faiths... It is noteworthy that this hope grows in parallel to the growth of Russian territories, as its victory banner gets closer to Western Asia”\(^\text{16}\). Its main rival here was still the Ottoman Empire which was home to a great many of Armenians. It was from there and also from parts of the Iranian monarchy that a huge stream of Armenians poured into the South Caucasus, predominantly into the Northern Azerbaijan. In the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, this process was developing with active participation of the Russian Empire and the Armenian Gregorian Church of Echmiadzin whose Catholicos was a theocratic leader\(^\text{17}\) of the Armenians following a third loss of the Armenian statehood in Asia Minor in the 11\(^{th}\) century\(^\text{18}\). Therefore, the definition of “Armenian geographic space” attributed to the east of Asia Minor

\(^{15}\) CSHA RF. F. 880. Po.5. D. 389. L.17 ob.

\(^{16}\) V. Velichko. The Caucasus. The Russian affair and inter-tribal points. P.76-77.

\(^{17}\) V. Velichko. The Caucasus. Russian affairs and inter-tribal points. Ch. 10

\(^{18}\) K. Yuzbashyan, Armenian states of the times of Badratids and Byzantine of the 9\(^{th}\)-11\(^{th}\) centuries. P.4-5, 170; G. Sarkisyan, K. Khudaverdyan, K. Yuzbashyan. Ancestry of Hayk. Essay on history and culture of Armenia from ancient times to the formation of the Third Republic. Ch. Vi and VII.
where there were Armenian kingdoms before, started to apply to the territory of the Caucasus in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. This is how a new geographic notion, “the Caucasus Armenia”, emerged at the expense of Azerbaijani lands.

To confirm the above, let’s have a look at the following. When the Russian-Iranian War (1826-1828) ended in signing the Treaty of Turkmenchay, Emperor Nicolai I (1825-1855) issued a “high resolution” to the Senate on 21 March 1828 saying that “on the strength of the treaty with Persia concluded on 10 February 1828, I enjoin henceforth that the Khanate of Erivan and the Khanate of Nakhchivan annexed to Russia shall be called the Armenian region”\textsuperscript{19}.

The Russian Empire believed that the Armenians would fit well into the plan on a complete Christianization of the Caucasus. There were enough grounds for that. First, there were much more Armenians than any other eastern Christians in Muslim states. Second, they mainly lived in Ottoman and Iranian monarchies which were Russia’s principal rivals in the struggle for the Caucasus. Third, they were indispensable in Russia’s rivalry with the Iranian and Ottoman states because they knew their strengths and weaknesses very well. Fourth, the Armenians were “light on their feet” and always ready for “change of place” if this promised them any benefit. Fifth, their motto was “ubi bene ibi patria” (where there is bread, there is my country). Sixth, they had not had their own statehood for 500 years by then.

For these reasons, after the Russian-Iranian (1826-1828) and Russian-Ottoman wars (1828-1829) had ended, the Treaty of Adrianople with Istanbul and the Treaty of Turkmenchay with Tehran specifically stipulated migratory preferences for the settlement of Ottoman and Iranian Armenians on Russian lands. Most of them settled down on the territory of former Azerbaijani khanates of Erivan, Nakhchivan and Karabakh which were abolished in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. To facilitate the mass migration of the Armenians, the authorities set up special commissions that provided

\textsuperscript{19} CSHA RF F. 1018. Sp. 9. D. 21. L. 1 ob
them with funds, vehicles and escorts\textsuperscript{20}.

The Armenians played an important part in the Russian Army alongside senior Russian officials, including minister, diplomat and poet A. Griboyedov. Particularly active was Col Lazarev, who even addressed his fellow tribesmen with an Armenian-language letter listing the benefits Russia was promising them. “Christians! … I am announcing to you that the noble monarch of Russia grants you the opportunity to move to and settle down anywhere you like in peaceful and safe lands of Erivan, Nakhchivan and Karabakh ... You will have an exemption from all tax for six years. In Russia... you will find a new motherland populated by Christians and your holy faith will not be oppressed ever since! You will be protected by laws there and feel the benefits of that. Finally, you will improve your welfare there...”\textsuperscript{21}

The participation of senior officials in the migration process demonstrates that, first, Russia was very keen on resettling the Armenians in the Caucasus; second, it was interested in the process running smoothly; and third, it wanted to push the “Russian cause” and the “Russian way” in the Caucasus.

After completion of the Iranian Armenians’ migration to the Caucasus, Kh. Lazarev submitted a detailed “Report to the Earl of Erivan, Commander-in-Chief of the Separate Caucasus Corps, Infantry General and Adjutant General Pashkevich”. It said, “Among the glorious victories of the troops of the Separate Caucasus Corps, Your Excellence witnessed the dedication of the Armenian people who participated in the successes of the Russian weaponry... As a commandant of Tabriz, I was, by your will, preoccupied with the said people’s migration. Being of the same faith, I often communicated to Your Excellency the reverence of the Armenians for the holy name of the Great Monarch of Russia who facilitates the prosperity of their fellow tribesmen. After you reached a glorious peace accord with Persia in 1828, Your Excellency honored me with the duty of serving one of your very useful plans for our Motherland: to resettle Christians from Persian lands to Russia’s

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\item[21] Ditto. P. 107-111.
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newly-acquired provinces of Nakhchivan and Erivan, which are now called the Armenian region by the will of the Monarch. After the enslavement that weighed upon the Armenian people and their Church for more than four centuries, a first resolute step towards uniting this people under the protection of powerful Russia and its mild and wise laws would be the beginning of a great cause! This is your cause! As to me, a Russian officer honored by Your Excellency with such a prestigious mission, this does me enormous credit and makes me extremely happy as an Armenian… On 26 February 1828, I received Your Excellency’s instruction to resettle the Armenians from Adderbijan to Erivan, Nakhchivan and Karabakh provinces… Due to a lack of public lands for migration in the Nakhchivan Khanate, I attempted to persuade Armenians to settle down in the Khanates of Erivan and Karabakh, and they followed my advice”

This is how the Armenian factor emerged on the ethno-political map of the Caucasus. Initially, Russia directed the Armenian migration vector towards Northern Azerbaijan. On the other hand, if the Russian Empire had not seen the Armenians as an important element in establishing control over the Caucasus, it would have hardly treated them favorably.

22 S. Glinka, Resettlement of the Armenians of Adderbijan to the borders of Russia. M.,1831. P. 112-134.
ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CAUCASUS ARMENIANS FOR RUSSIA

Experts in the Caucasus affairs viewed as a clearly negative phenomenon the appearance, actions and influence of the Armenian factor in the Caucasus, especially in its political, ethnic, confessional, territorial, economic, social and commercial life. Thus, in the early 20th century proponents of Russian autocracy saw it as a threat to the “Russian cause” in a region seen as an important source of raw materials for the Russian economy and its southward advancement. The region was rich in oil and cotton, natural dyes and silk, carpets and sturgeons, black caviar and copper, timber and wool; the road to Iran, India and warm seas started from here. Therefore, the Caucasus played a key role in the Russian Empire’s strategic policies in the south.

Along with the Armenian infiltration in all spheres of life in the Caucasus, there were also repeated anti-Russian campaigns initiated both by the Armenian triad “church-party-Diaspora” and by Russia’s geopolitical rivals in the Caucasus – the Ottoman, British, French and Iranian superpowers. Speaking about this and pointing to an “Armenian mark” in the region, N. Shavrov said in the early 20th century that over 1 million Armenians were settled in Northern Azerbaijan alone. This was largely facilitated by high-ranking Armenians serving in Russia, including Generals K. Lazarev, V. Madatov, G. Ter-Gukasov, V. Bebutov, L. Malikov, M. Loris-Melikov, M. Argutinski-Dolgorukov, S. Kishmishev, as well as the Catholicoses of Echmiadzin Joseph, David V, Daniel I, Ephraim I and Ovanes VIII. This is exactly why it was Armenians, not Russians, who were settled in the newly-established and highly prolific Kars region of the Caucasus after the Russian-Ottoman
war (1877-1878). As a result, as N. Shavrov put it, “over the 100 years of rule in the Caucasus, the state settled more than 1,200,000 non-Russians and only 24,000 Russians on the vacant lands there”\textsuperscript{23}. Back in the 1880s, N. Shavrov examined the benefits and importance of the South Caucasus, first of all, Azerbaijan, for the Russian economy\textsuperscript{24}. He pointed to the importance of the Caucasus railway for the exports of Russian goods to Iran and India via the Black, Caspian and Mediterranean Seas. In a separate chapter, the author examined the significance of the Caspian Sea, focusing on Russia’s interests in the region. In fact, N. Shavrov described Baku as “the key to the success of our business in the Caucasus and Persia”\textsuperscript{25}.

Considering the importance of the Caucasus for Russia, another Russian expert A. Budilovich said Russia should step up its influence on the outskirts of the Empire, including the Caucasus, given the Armenians’ activity in the region\textsuperscript{26}. Another Russian analyst of the Caucasus affairs I. Kanadeyev called for protecting the peoples of the Caucasus from the pernicious influence of the Armenians whose separatism leads to the appearance of variousautonomies or indeed an Armenian statehood in the Caucasus where it had never existed before. The Armenianism is supported by the Dashnaktsutyun political party mostly made up of Ottoman Armenians. They are ready to take up arms to carry out their goals of seizing other territories, establishing an Armenian statehood and continuing the process of Armenian resettlement to the Caucasus. In other words, the author did not rule out that Armenian goals in the Caucasus could lead to Russia’s defeats in its wars in the West. The expert added that the Armenians had settled down firmly in Northern Azerbaijan: there are more Armenians than Russians in the Baku oil industry and the richest of the local millionaires are Armenians A. Mantashev and A. Gukasov\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{23} N. Shavrov, A new threat to Russian affairs in the Caucasus: forthcoming sale of Mungan to non-Russians. S. Petersburg, 1911. P. 64-72.
\textsuperscript{24} N. Shavrov, The Russian way to the Caucasus. S. Petersburg, 1883.
\textsuperscript{25} Ditto. P. 53.
\textsuperscript{26} A. Budilovich, Can Russia give its suburbs to non-Russians? S. Petersburg, 1907.
\textsuperscript{27} I. Kanadeyev, Essays about life in the Caucasus. S. Petersburg, 1902. P.5-33
In the early 20th century, the unlawful and anti-Russian activities of the Armenians in the Caucasus were known to many. While pointing out these and other negative phenomena pertaining to the Armenians, prominent Russian expert on the Caucasus V. Velichko wrote about their arrogance and cruelty towards the weak and servile sycophancy towards the more powerful, an amazing ability to advertise themselves and insatiable vanity. Velichko also pointed to the Armenians’ speculation with “Christianity” which they thought made them more privileged than their Muslim neighbors. Moreover, the Armenians believed that as “Christian” they were entitled to some benefits. Under this pretext, they controlled trade in the entire Caucasus. The Armenians are where there is a chance of making a profit. At the same time, they always have a grudge against others. V. Velichko also noted that every Russian war with its eastern neighbors increases and enriches Russia’s Armenian population. For instance, the oil boom in Baku made Armenians more powerful in economic and political affairs of the Caucasus. As a result, some Russians working in the Caucasus became dependent on wealthy Armenians - they controlled banks and the Caucasus press. Besides, the Armenians of the South Caucasus, under pressure from Echmiadzin, revitalized the “Great Armenia” myth and, under the leadership of Dashnaksutyan, even engaged in “revolutionary” propaganda on the territory of Russia. At the same time, they terrorize the local population. According to Velichko, “the horror of the Turkish massacre (the 1890s – M.M.) pales into insignificance in comparison with the cold-blooded Satanic cruelty of “civilized” Armenians in the deportation of Russians from the territories occupied at the cost of Russian blood”. The Muslim population of the South Caucasus, and indeed other places, is already caught in Armenian traps. The, Armenians buy the lands of Georgian princes, Azerbaijani agalars (men of wealth and status), and seize public properties. In fact, Armenian propagandists even opposed the settlement of Russian migrants on vacant lands in the South Caucasus. V. Velichko concludes that Armenians have been de facto landlords in the Caucasus for 40 years. In the absence of an Armenian statehood, the Armenian

factor is supported and guided by the Armenian Church which puts “the secret political mission above religious”. When the Russian authorities sequestered the Echmiadzin property on 12 June 1903 in an effort to forestall such activities, this was met with acts of terror, including an attempt on the life of Prince and Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus G. Golitsyn who initiated the sequester.\(^{29}\)

Well-known Russian expert on the Caucasus M. Menshikov wrote\(^{30}\) that there was really no-one in charge of the Caucasus because the official Russian authorities, including Earl Vorontsov-Dashkov, are heavily influenced by the Armenians. This is why Armenian “revolutionary” parties of *Dashnaksutyun* and *Gnchak* feel absolutely free. Moreover, “any Armenian can finish a Russian secondary or higher school by hook or by crook and be sure to enjoy the rights of a public officer and introduce his alien views into our ruling class”. While indicating how influential Armenians have become both in the Caucasus and the Russian Empire as a whole, the author highlights that the attempt to take the Dashnaks to court for their terrorist activities in the Caucasus proved futile because the judiciary was also exposed to pressures from Armenian terrorists. This is the consequence of the fact that Armenians are gradually taking charge of the Caucasus by seizing lands, money, trade and even the local administration. When the Armenians complete their peaceful seizure of the Caucasus, Armenian patriots will get much closer to their final goal of establishing an Armenian state in the Caucasus, M. Menshikov writes.

Taking into account these passages from M. Menshikov’s observations, let’s now point to a unique event in the 19th century Russian Empire relating to Armenians in public service. Russian General, Earl M. Loris-Melikov (1825-1888) served in the Caucasus, was in charge of the Ter region, participated in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. Then he was governor-general of Astrakhan, Saratov, Samara and Kharkov. After an explosion in the Zimniy Dvorets (The Winter Palace) on 12 February 1880, he was appointed Chief of the Supreme Executive Commission.

\(^{29}\) Ditto. P. 142

established “to struggle against sedition”. Working in this capacity, he received emergency authority: all supreme institutions of the Empire were subordinated to him. As a result, he “became a dictator”. After the commission was abolished, Loris-Melikov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire. However, he was dismissed after the assassination of Emperor Alexander II on 1 March 1881 and was considered one of those responsible for the “1 March catastrophe”31.

Therefore, the Armenians have had considerable influence in Russia since then. Suffice it to enumerate their high-ranking representatives who have been in the Russian/Soviet elite since the 19th century. They are scattered around both vertically and horizontally, and this is thanks not only to M. Loris-Melikov in the 19th century, but also A. Mikoyan in the 20th.

Describing the Caucasus peoples, one of the founders of Eurasianism, Prince Trubetskoy, wrote in the early 20th century: “Armenians are always easy to agree with. However, it would be a mistake to place stake on them. Economically strong and by controlling economic affairs in the Caucasus, they also have the features of a parasite nation. They are treated with aversion that quite often develops into hatred. To identify oneself with them would mean becoming an object of antipathy and hatred, too. The example of a prerevolutionary period (early 20th century – M.M.) which left Russia alone with the Armenians and set other Caucasus peoples against it must serve as a good lesson for the future”32.

Pointing to the Armenian radicals’ “persistence”, the outstanding Azerbaijan playwright, state and political figure N. Narimanov, wrote in the early 20th century that there were two categories of members in the Dashnaktsutyun Party: Ottoman and Russian Armenians. Describing the situation in the Republic of Ararat, established on 28 May 1918 on the territories of the former Erivan Khanate and governed by the said party, Narimanov observed a difference in the political mentality of the two categories of Armenians: “While Russian Armenians (residents of the former

32 N. Trubetskoi, About peoples of the Caucasus // IRS-Heritage (Moscow), 2003. No. 7. P. 22
Russian Empire) seem to understand the objective state of things, realize that this practice is ruinous for the country..., Turkish Armenians, on the contrary, are very belligerent and do not think about a negotiated solution to any problems. In fact, they are the ones who instigate different repressions and adventures... Turkish Armenians are the leading force in *Dashnaktsutyan*, and, therefore, in the government”\(^{33}\).

This leads to the conclusion that Ottoman Armenians are more inclined to use the Armenian factor by force, including terror, than their fellow tribesmen. Naturally, the central role in this was played by Dashnaktsutyan whose activities were initially carried out on the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while characterizing the political image and “firmness” of Dashnaktsutyan, N. Narimanov pointed to a “omnivorous nature of the party”, its lack of principle and the anything goes attitude. Describing the activity of Dashnaks in general and in the Caucasus in particular, he wrote, “In the 30 years of their political life, Dashnaks have demonstrated readiness to assume any color and wear any mask for the sake of their dream of a Great Armenia. The Dashnaks were regarded as a revolutionary party during the reign of Golitsyn, but later kissed the feet of Vorontsov-Dashkov and became ardent counter-revolutionaries. The reason was Vorontsov’s promise to create a Great Armenia after the war. But when the Turks went on the offensive under Sarikamish and launched an attack on Tiflis, the scared Dashnak leader of Tiflis, Khatisov, started preparing grounds for friendship with the Turks: the Dashnaks have preserved this feature to the present day. If a Soviet system is established in the Caucasus now, Dashnaks will immediately change their color, become communists and want to take charge in Azerbaijan and Georgia”\(^{34}\).

Speaking about the “Great Armenia” myth in the ideology of Dashnaktsutyan, N. Narimanov pointed out that while leading the Republic of Ararat, the Dashnaks cast its population into many


\(^{34}\) N. Narimanov, Selected works. Vol. 2. P. 194-195. Golitsyn G. was the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus in 1897-1904; I. Vorontsov-Dashkov held the same post in 1905-1915.
troubles. “It is no secret that this is the fault of the Dashnaks who have brought the unfortunate Armenian people to its current impasse by chanting ‘Hayastan, Hayastan’ all the time.\(^{35}\)

Therefore, the nature of Dashnaktsutyun’s actions invariably proves that it is extremely important for it to realize its goals using the Armenian factor. The last governor-general in the Caucasus, Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich Romanov, specifically highlighted “an uncomfortable element” in the region – the Armenian triad of the “church-party-Diaspora” and the Armenian factor. He said in a report to Emperor Nikolai II, “Politically, Armenians cause difficulties for regional authorities. Ethnically united, they, through their vast intelligentsia, never give up the political dream of an autonomous Armenia. …Having largely lost to their original ecclesiasticism and religiousness, Armenians hold their Catholicos in high esteem as a symbol of their national ideals. This is why the Catholicos is always at the center of political action and is inevitably affected by secular leaders of the Armenian public opinion.”\(^{36}\)

He also noted that “Russian Armenians” were heavily influenced by Armenian committees in Europe and America, which “support the political dreams of an Armenian autonomy” thus “whipping up anti-government and even revolutionary sentiments among Russian Armenians.”\(^{37}\)

\(^{35}\) N. Narimanov, Selected works. Vol. 2. P. 216.


ARMENIANS’ ATTEMPTS TO REALIZE THE “GREAT ARMENIA” MYTH IN THE CAUCASUS

Before the mass migration of the Armenians to the Caucasus (first third of the 19th century), the situation in the region was relatively stable. To improve the Russian system of local governance, the Caucasus Governorate was established in January 1786. The security of Russian estates in the Caucasus was bolstered by the opening of Georgian military road from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis (via the Daryal Pass) in 1799. Russia’s further military and political activity in the region was marked by new territorial gains. After seizing the entire South Caucasus in the first third of the 19th century, Russia got rid of Azerbaijani and Georgian state bodies and established districts instead. At the same time, Russia embarked on a mass resettlement of Ottoman and Iranian Armenians to the region. It was the territories of the local Muslims, i.e. Azerbaijani and Meskhetian Turks, that were mainly used in the resettlement.

The appearance of a significant mass of Armenians in the South Caucasus led to a revival of the “Great Armenia” myth in the minds of their leaders. The Russian Empire, for its part, was also interested in using the Armenian satellite factor both in the Caucasus proper and against its arch foes in the struggle for the region – the Ottoman and Iranian states. Therefore, it had no objection to backing the “Great Armenia” myth in word but did not make any effort to implement it.

While looking at “the Great Armenia issue” in retrospect, it can observe that although the Russian Empire fell apart about a century ago, the Ottoman Empire has also ceased to exist and there

is no USSR either, the “Great Armenia” myth still lives on. Its ideologists are not giving up attempts to materialize this obsession. Armenian claims on their current neighbors are among the numerous consequences of this obsession. This explains the nature of conflicts, because shortly after settlement to a territory, Armenian scholars start claiming that it originally belonged to them. Armenian leaders follow the principle that “possession is equal to nine tenths of ownership”.

In this connection, let’s refer to the events of 1918-1920 which characterize a standard behavior or a syndrome the Armenian triad of the “church-party-Diaspora” has followed for decades. After the collapse of the triune Caucasus Democratic Federative Republic (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) on 26 May 1918, as early as on 4 June of the same year the “independent” Republic of Ararat, led by the Dashnaksutun Party, signed a “peace and friendship treaty” with the Ottoman Empire. Under the treaty, the territory of the Republic was defined as covering 4,000 British sq. miles, i.e. 10,000 sq. km. These were the Erivan and Echmiadzin districts, i.e. the lands of the former Erivan Khanate of Azerbaijan. In the same year, winner-states of World War I “presented” the Republic of Ararat with the Kars district of the former Caucasus Governorate of the Russian Empire that broke up in March 1917 and a part of the Erivan province, i.e. also Azerbaijani lands. As a result, the territory of the Republic of Ararat reached 17,500 British


sq. miles\textsuperscript{41}, i.e. 43,750 sq. km. However, “insatiable Dashnaks laid claims to Akhalkalaki and Borchalo territories, which were part of Georgia, and to Karabakh, Nakhchivan and the south of the former Elisabethpol Province which were also part of Azerbaijan”\textsuperscript{42}. Therefore, in December 1918, the Republic of Ararat started a war with the Democratic Republic of Georgia which was only stopped after British interference. Shortly afterwards, however, Erevan began a long and bloody war with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Only the appearance of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Red Army of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in the South Caucasus ended the hostilities, but the region ended up becoming part of Soviet Russia.

Armenian claims to Turkey, which was home to hundreds of thousands of Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia, are no less significant. Interestingly, there are no claims to the Islamic Republic of Iran – a “friend” of the Republic of Armenia. Territorial claims to neighbors territories were stepped up in the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The “Union of Patriots” emerged in 1956 and the “Armenian Youth Union” in 1963. Their main goal was to “revive Armenian statehood in full” but the meaning of this definition and the part of the world in which they planned to carry it out was not spelled out. But the territorial claims to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and even Russia shed light on Armenian aspirations to create a “Great Armenia” at the expense of their neighbors. The US Armenian National Committee demanded in 1945 that “the territories forcibly occupied by Turkey”\textsuperscript{43} be returned to Soviet Armenia. With this aim, the “Party of national reunion” was established in Yerevan in 1967. Its key demand was the revival of the “Great Armenia” which envisaged annexation of the eastern part of Asia Minor, the Republic of Armenia, Nakhchivan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Javakheti, Borchali, Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories, Rostov


\textsuperscript{42} Ditto.

and Astrakhan Districts, all under the Armenian tricolor. And again no claims to Iran.

Without waiting for the actual transfer of the listed territories to them, Armenian scholars went ahead and included them in this virtual geographical space on the maps of “Great Armenia”.

All this was not happening unbeknownst to Moscow, for the Kremlin wanted to capitalize on the situation after the Soviet victory in World War II. However, allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USA and Great Britain, had their own plans for the Muslim East, including Turkey, and did not want the existing political and territorial status quo to change. Nonetheless, Armenian scholars continue publishing researches in an attempt to prove the Armenian origin of the said territories.

One of such “researches” is the work by an outstanding Armenian scholar, Academician G. Kapantsian. He suggests that “the cradle of Armenians” is Hayas, “the territory of Hayk”, a mythological father of the Armenian ethnicity, i.e. Eastern Anatolia - in other words, Turkey.

When it turned out that they were highly unlikely to receive anything of Turkish territory, Armenian scholars ran to another extreme. They “went” eastwards and linked the ancient past of their people to Soviet Armenia, i.e. to the Azerbaijani historical district of Chukhur-Saad where Azerbaijani khanates of Erivan and Nakhchivan existed until 1828. Armenian scholars led by well-known geographer and historian, Academician S. Yeremyan, even provided maps to substantiate their claim of Armenia

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stretching “from the sea to the sea”, i.e. claims were laid to territories in the triangle of Caspian-Black-Mediterranean seas. In doing so, the medieval tradition of applying the definition of a “sea” to any body of water, including lakes, was ignored. For example, a well-known 15th century historian and geographer, Hafiz-I Abru, who served great conqueror Gurkhan (ruler) Timur and authored a research on general history “Zubdat at-Tavarih” (“The Creams of Chronicles”), wrote that lakes were called “seas” in his time. For example, Turks call the present Lake Sevan “Goycha-deniz”, i.e. the “Blue Sea”. Seas were considered “oceans” at the time. Therefore, the “Great Armenia” from the sea to the sea must have implied the territory within the triangle of the “Van-Sevan-Urmia” lakes at best.

Therefore, the “Great Armenia” myth, and indeed the whole Armenian history, has long been inculcated in the collective memory of this people. This is exactly why “Armenian historiography” has a comparatively long tradition and is well equipped with historical narratives. As a result, there are several periods in the virtual and mythological history of the Armenian people, not Armenia proper.

First is the 19th century when great efforts were made to substantiate a great history which, what is very important, is associated with Asia Minor. Armenian scholars did not lay claims to the Caucasus at the time. The reason was that the Caucasus was part of the Russian Empire where most Armenians lived. Therefore, if Armenian patriotism means “love” of Russia, hatred towards the Turks and neutrality towards the Persians, then they should certainly refrain from claims to the Caucasus. In fact, according to a contemporary author, “Russophilia in Armenia is the consequence of loneliness in the face of strong Muslim neighbors.” Strange as it may seem, the conclusion is that if Armenians have a new goal tomorrow, they will not fail to “sacrifice” Russia.

The second period is the collapse of the Russian Empire and

the establishment of the Republic of Ararat (1918-1920), the first Armenian state in the Caucasus, a place where an Armenian state had never existed before. The then leadership of the Republic, the Dashnaksutyn Party, set it against neighbors: it started a war with Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to seize Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhchivan, Borchali, Samtskhe-Javakheti, and Tao-Klardjeti.

The third period is the Soviet time (1920-1991) when claims were made to Turkey over Eastern Anatolia.

Fourth is a post-Soviet period starting in 1991 and still ongoing. It is called “innovation” – Armenian scholars declared the Armenian people “autochthons” of the Caucasus. Consequences of this announcement include:

- war with Azerbaijan which started in 1988, i.e. in the USSR time, and ended in 1994, when Armenia and Azerbaijan were independent republics;
- declaration of independence by self-styled Nagorno-Karabakh republic;
- occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts;
- claims to Georgian regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli (Borchali);
- the demand of a “cultural autonomy” for ethnic Armenians of Krasnodar Territory of Russia, i.e. Armenia’s strategic partner.

All four periods have a few common features:

- “Armenia’s unending pain over a lack of an independent state for the greater part of the middle ages and afterwards until 1918”\(^{49}\);
- “Odd relationship between actual historical events on the one hand and the way they were interpreted through narrations of various cultures and traditions on the other, and, finally, how this affected the formation of a collective memory”\(^{50}\);

\(^{49}\) V. Shnirelman, Wars of memory. Myths, identity and politics in The Caucasus. P. 98.

\(^{50}\) R. Karagezov, Metamorphoses of the collective memory in Russia and Central Caucasus. P. 315-316.
irrational” because of the initiative and contribution of the “church-party-Diaspora” triad;

- It is the “church-party-Diaspora” triad that has largely molded the collective memory of the Armenian ethnicity, and this had to be done in the conditions of a lack of an Armenian state;
- Under such circumstances, the Armenian Church, the oldest component of the triad existing for over 1,600 years, was at the forefront. It is the Church that has preserved the ethnic memory, language, culture and history of the Armenian people. This is why its the role and contribution are stated under Article 8.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and the Law “On relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Church”\(^\text{51}\). Therefore, the slogans, propositions and programs of the Dashnaktsutyun Party and the Armenian Diaspora rest on the ideas of the Armenian Church.

As is evident, the Armenians have been trying since the start of the 20\(^{th}\) century to create a “Great Armenia” in the Caucasus and neighboring territories. However, they seem to forget K. Marx’s prophetic words that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce. In the case of Yerevan, it repeats itself as bloody farce.

In this connection, it is worth recalling the words by prominent Azerbaijan politician, playwright and first leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, N. Narimanov. “I remember several Menshevik leaders, including Jordania, Gegechkori and others, coming to Ramishvili’s office in Tbilisi in the summer of 1917. We were discussing statements by Armenian nationalists in St. Petersburg in support of the “Great Armenia” idea. They demanded control over the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, up until Rostov. I was asked, “What is your opinion?” I said, “This will make our people think

about a ‘Great Azerbaijan’ and yours about a ‘Great Georgia’."

N. Narimanov’s view is confirmed by the opinion of a well-known Georgian historian, Academician I. Javakhishvili. He wrote of a fantastic map of Armenia published in Istanbul in 1918 on which it was “stretching from the Black to the Caspian Sea, from a place east of Samsun to the Mediterranean Sea, from north of Seleucia to Ardebil. The border of this ends by the Caspian Sea. Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Miskheta and even Tbilisi are shown as part of Armenia, while Georgia represents a narrow strip. Yet another map of Armenia was published in Istanbul at about the same time. Armenia is shown as a huge state with the same boundaries. It included a large part of Turkey – Trapezund, Ordu, Kesaria, Adana, Edessa. Even the north of Persia, including Tabriz and Ardebil (i.e. South Azerbaijan – M.M.), are shows as parts of Armenia. In comparison with the fantastic map, Georgia is slightly bigger: its border on the Black Sea begins south of Batumi and north of Makriali. Imerkhevi is shown as part of Armenia, Akhaltsikhe of Georgia, while Akhalkalaki is within the Armenian borders. From here the border runs north, and this line is shown as the state border between Georgia and Armenia.

Then, the Armenian border runs along the Mtkvari (the Alazan River – M.M.). Ganja is shown as Armenian territory as well. Obviously, this new Armenian state was not based on the ethnographic principle. Neither does the scheme have a historical foundation, because Armenia, which ceased to exist politically after the 11th century, has never had such borders. Authors of the map are unlikely to have commonsense either. A high-level Armenian government delegation tabled the map at the Paris Peace Conference on the results of World War II and asked for approval of the Armenian state with the boundaries shown... However, the false nature of the map and of the statistical data provided by the Armenian delegation were quickly exposed. This undermined the confidence of French, British and American representatives in the Armenian delegation... The plan of a great Armenia

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burst like a soap bubble”53. Nevertheless, the territorial appetite of the Armenian grew even more in the 21st century. It is now the territories from the Pyrenees in the west through Central Asia in the east and from steppes in southern Russia in the north to North Africa and the Persian Gulf in the south54 that are considered to have been part of “Armenia“ in the 6th century B.C.

Here is the opinion of another Russian political analyst S. Lourie: “A distinctive feature of Armenian political consciousness is a constant analysis of all external factors of Armenian existence and the development of a geographical map on this basis. Modern political mythology covers Armenia’s historical experience of the last century, i.e. a period of incessant geopolitical cataclysms which developed into colossal historical tragedies for the Armenian people. Therefore, the Armenian way of political thinking is heavily dependent on geopolitical interests. Every experience of external contacts was reflected, interpreted and incorporated into a myth. Therefore, the Armenian world outlook represents some sort of a geopolitical picture of the world”55. The author writes further, “There is a phenomenon which can be described ‘political mythology’. It represents a legend about the history of people which was conjured up deliberately, has specific authors… and determines a people’s attitude towards the present, primarily towards politics. The Armenians had this legend in the late 19th century. Its authors are writers and analysts Artsruni Grigor, Raffi, Leo and Mkrtich Khrimyan, who were arduously engaged in promoting Armenian history focusing on its heroic aspects”. The said persons have earned quite a reputation in both Armenian history and Arme-nianism in general. They “made history complete, albeit mytho-logical, because judging by their researches, Armenian history is


54 S. Ayvazian, Historical maps of Armenia. Map 27.

nothing other than a series of heroic and beautiful legends\textsuperscript{56}.

There is a very important aspect in S. Lourie’s observations: only one of the mentioned Armenians is a historian – Leo (penname Babakhyan A., 1860-1932), a native of Shusha and author of publications on problems of Armenian history\textsuperscript{57}. As is the case with the other mentioned Armenians, he was one of the authors of myths about a “Great Armenia”. An active proponent of Armenianism, he believed that the Armenian ethnicity is superior to others. The others on the list are not even historians. Artsruni Grigor (1845-1892) is the author of a number of stories and plays, a founder and editor of the Mshak (The Worker) newspaper in 1872-1892. He has authored a number of political publications\textsuperscript{58}. Raffi is the penname of A. Melik-Akopian (1835-1888), a native of Iran. Judging by his surname, he is a descendant of Caucasus Albanian Christians resettled by Shah Abbas I Safavid from Karabakh to the depths of Iran in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. He has also written a number of novels, including David-Bek and Samvel. Through the novels he promoted the ideas of national liberation and anti-Ottoman sentiments, emphasizing that only an armed struggle could lead to the people’s liberation. Raffi expressed the essence of his work through the following phrase: “I write a historical novel not for the narration of historical facts, but for the modern movement I am interested in”\textsuperscript{59}. For this reason, Raffi’s novels are quite popular with Armenian nationalists. In fact, he can claim to hold a special place in the “church-party-Diaspora” triad. Mkrtich I Khrimyan was the Catholicos of Echmiadzin in 1892-1907. When the property of Echmiadzin was sequestrated by the decision of Russian authorities


\textsuperscript{58} The eastern matter. Tiflis, 1876; Turkish Armenians’ economic situation. M., 1880.

dated 12 June 1903, the Armenian spiritual leader anathematized the ruling house of the Romanovs, what characterizes him as “a ardent Armenian patriot and political figure”\(^60\).

The veracity of statements by Armenian historians, writers and clergy, in particular those mentioned above, isconcisely but effectively described by another Armenian author S. Mamulov: “There is an Armenian myth, an Armenian way of interpreting history. The key symbol of the Armenian myth is the level of civilization, i.e. the positioning of Armenians as an ancient nation, a nation possessing antique culture and spreading its civilizing influence to other nations. The second most important element is the introduction of Armenians as Christians and a Christian outpost in the East. The third element is the portraying of Armenians as helpless victims of uncivilized followers of different faiths (Armenian people are destined to suffer like Jesus Christ himself)”\(^61\).

Further, according to French historian Marc Ferro, “works” by the said Armenian scholars “provide a naïve and straightforward account of history. There are good and bad people, traitors and heroes. Armenia, which has suffered many defeats, exalts its own history and portrays itself as a martyr. Divided, broke, persecuted by the Turks and isolated from the rest of the world, Armenia makes its own history resembling a golden legend. This history features giants and powerful men who overpower and crush bulls. One can hardly imagine this people being defeated and losing statehood. An Armenian history book for children published by Armenian Benedictine monks in Venice in 1979 depicts Armenian misfortunes so skillfully that one can’t understand when Armenia was actually independent and when it was ruled by foreigners... The book dwells upon both legend and reality even when referring to periods studied by scientists quite well”\(^62\).

Other researches mentioned by M. Ferro include a publication

\(^{60}\) V. Velichko, The Caucasus. Russian affairs and inter-tribal points. P. 103.


by Armenian author S. Mamulov\textsuperscript{63}. This is not just a continuation of tales and myths about the Armenian ethnicity, a “pioneer” of all undertakings and achievements of mankind in the past and the present. This is a modernized Armenian tale about human sources and civilization that appeared, has been preserved and fostered only thanks to a “wonderful people from Wonderland”. It is not our goal to comment on what S. Mamulov has attributed to his “wonderful people”. We can only observe that he sees an Armenian trace even where it is not possible by definition: for example, in Ancient Egypt, in the genealogy of outstanding representatives of the Russian nation, in the study of names.

Let’s cite a few passages from S. Mamulov’s “research” (by preserving the style and orthography of the author) that will hopefully allow us to develop an idea about the essence of his work sacrificed on the altar of Armenianism:

- Armenians are “recognized leaders” in the art of survival;
- Armenians have a long memory;
- Armenians can create anything from nothing;
- Armenians always want to surprise others;
- Every Armenian is a merchant at heart, by nature, passion and inclination;
- The Armenian alphabet is much more progressive than any other;
- The world’s first secular theatre was established in Armenia;
- First human prostitution institutions existed in ancient pagan temples of Armenia and Greece;
- The Armenian language is the most ancient of all human languages;
- Ekaterina II considered Armenians a very industri

ous people and settled them in places where cities were to be built;

• Armenians held senior posts in L. Beria’s team;
• People from the Wonderland are truly wonderful;
• Armenians are one of the first peoples to emerge on the map of the ancient world;
• Armenian character ... It has brought and still brings so many bitter moments and misfortunes to the Armenians;
• Armenians like hurting and humiliating each other;
• Armenians suffer from self-admiration;
• Armenia is among the worst countries in the world for the rate of population decrease – the number of people who have left the country since 1991 exceeds 2 million, i.e. more than half of the country’s total (3.5 million);
• Armenian hill-men are Caucasus mountain Armenians or Circassian Armenians (Muslims);
• Armenian Muslims are Hopa Hemşinli who have preserved the language and identity;
• Armenian masochism is the cult of suffering typical of Armenians;
• Armenian world is an Armenian way of interpreting history;
• There were a lot of Armenians in Stalin’s entourage;
• The Hyksos (proto-Armenian foreign rulers) ruled Egypt from 1710 to 1560 B.C.
• Nefertiti, princess of Egypt, was one of the most beautiful women of the ancient world;
• Armenians were the most numerous and dominant people of the Byzantine Empire;
• Gaius Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.), Augustus (63 B.C.), Traianus (53-117), Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus (243-313) are of Armenian origin;
• In 1929-1932, the Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg sold out a part of its collection. Gulbenkian,
an Armenian living in Paris, became owner of the collection;

- The Duduk is a unique Armenian wind instrument;
- Pop star Lolita (Milavskaya) was raised by an Armenian stepfather;
- Shalakho is an Armenian humorous dance;
- Tabaka (chicken flattened and grilled on charcoal) is an Armenian dish;
- Armenian women on the thrones of different states: Nefertiti (Egypt), Helene and Salome (Georgia) and Nur Jahan (India).

Thus, the Armenian collective memory, historical researches, publications and fiction are all intended by Armenians and the “church-party-Diaspora” triad to work for the past and present ideology of the Armenians and Armenianism, for their historical and territorial myths where the Caucasus is always at the centre.
ARMENIANS’ KARABAKH SYNDROME: BACKGROUND AND REALIZATION

The foundation of the syndrome was laid in the first third of the 19th century, when the Russian Empire started organized settlement of Ottoman and Iranian Armenians on Azerbaijani territories in the South Caucasus. They occupied the territories of the liquidated Azerbaijani khanates of Nakhchivan and Erivan which were renamed into the Armenian region in 1828. In 1849, the region was named the Erivan province. In 1918-1920, the Republic of Ararat governed by the Dashnaksutyan Party appeared on the same territory. This is how a previously unknown politicized notion of the “Caucasian Armenia” emerged. It embodied an Armenian state in Asia Minor that had been lost four times before - in the 6th, 9th, 11th and 14th centuries. At the same time, the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation, heavily fuelled supported from the outside, began. It can be classified as a 100-year-long Armenian-Azerbaijani war initiated by external forces. The Armenian triad of the “church-party-Diaspora”, still dreaming of the “Great Armenia” myth, took an active part in the developments.

The 100-year-long Armenian-Azerbaijani war is an extensive campaign with “cold” and “hot” phases. The “cold” phase consists of different Armenian would-be researches whereby claims are made to Azerbaijani lands. Another form is the regular appeals to Moscow asking for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. “Hot” phases occur at the time of global or regional cataclysms or when the Armenians become independent yet again. It

is at these moments that the Armenian triad, believing that this is the moment of truth for reviving the “Great Armenia” obsession, becomes “spontaneously” but synchronically active. And aggression against neighboring states comes to the foreground.

This is what happened during the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. It followed major depression in the Russian Empire that affected all spheres of life: political, social, economic, confessional and ethnic. In order to prevent a pandemic collapse, the authorities took a number of drastic measures, including ethnic relations. This resulted in a genocide of the Azerbaijanis executed by Armenian militants instigated by the triad. The first outbreak of the genocide was registered in Baku in February 1905, then in the summer and autumn of the same year; and then in Baku, Elisabethpol and Erivan provinces in 1906. The genocide of Azerbaijanis was also perpetrated after World War One in the wake of the establishment of the Republic of Ararat which waged undeclared wars with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan, with the emerging Republic of Turkey over “Turkish Armenia” and with the Democratic Republic of Georgia over Javakheti and Borchali. This was accompanied by the first deportation and assaults on the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Ararat. The campaign was orchestrated by the ruling Dashnaktsutyun Party whose punitive detachments were implementing a plan on the extermination of the Azerbaijanis.

Stepan Shaumyan, who headed Soviet power in Baku in 1917-1918, contributed a lot to the genocide. On 31 March 1918, a massacre was unleashed against Azerbaijanis by the Dashnaks, Baku Bolsheviks and the Armenian corps of the Russian Army in the Caucasus. At about the same time, the Republic of Ararat supported by the Armenian Diaspora stepped up activities against the ADR. As a result, due to a major anti-Azerbaijani campaign unfolded by the Armenian lobby in France, the official delegation of the ADR was four months late for the Paris Peace Conference on the results

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of World War One\textsuperscript{66}. Moreover, there was global anti-Azerbaijani propaganda. The Armenian community of the USA was lobbying the interests of the Republic of Ararat and distributing anti-Azerbaijani leaflets to different institutions, including the White House. US Congressman W. Chandler wrote to A. Topchibashev, leader of the ADR Parliament who was heading the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Conference, that “US Armenians are strongly opposed to the idea of an independent Azerbaijan”\textsuperscript{67}. The same community succeeded in delaying the issue of visas for an Azerbaijani delegation to the USA following the refusal of Baku “to carry goods for the Armenians” through the territory of the ADR\textsuperscript{68}.

The deportation of Azerbaijanis from the Caucasian Armenia continued in the Soviet time, too this time on a “lawful” basis. Thus, Stalin signed two identical decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 December 1947 and 10 March 1948 “On the resettlement of Azerbaijani collective farmers from the Armenian SSR to the Kura-Aras lowland of the Azerbaijan SSR”.

The Karabakh problem has “cold” and “hot” phases, too. The former were made up of Yerevan’s official appeals to Moscow, which eventually led to the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) in 1923. However, Armenian claims did not end at that. In Soviet years, the Armenian SSR put forward 16 proposals on renaming the NKAR into the Armenian NKAR and 45 on the NKAR’s right to join the Armenian SSR\textsuperscript{69}. The Kremlin authorities invited M. Bagirov, the then Azerbaijani leader, to express his opinion on the problem. On 10 December 1945, M. Bagirov wrote in his response: the Armenization of Nagorno-Karabakh occurred after the Russian Empire occupied Azerbaijan in the first third of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The present NKAR was part of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh khanate with the center of Shusha. During


\textsuperscript{67} History of Azerbaijan in documents and publications. P. 233.

\textsuperscript{68} Ditto. P. 236.

the years of the ADR, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the Karabakh governorate with the center of Shusha. On 7 July 1923, the NKAR was established. Baku does not object to the joining of the NKAR to Armenia provided that the Azizbekov, Vedin and Garabaglar regions of Armenia, populated mainly by Azerbaijani, become part of Azerbaijan.\(^{70}\)

The “hot” phases started in 1918 and led to Yerevan’s second undeclared war with Azerbaijan in 1988-1994. Armenia seized the NKAR and turned it into a self-styled Nagorno-Karabakh republic. It has also occupied seven other Azerbaijan districts: Lachin, Kalbajar, Gubadli, Jarayil, Zangilan, Fizuli and Agdam. At the same time, the Caucasian Armenia has “got rid of” all Azerbaijanis. All this did not occur unbeknownst to superpowers and major states of the region which were interested not in the fate of Armenia or Azerbaijan, but were pursuing their own ends in the Caucasus.

Karabakh was part of their interest. In fact, it emerged at a very opportune moment for external players speculating on the problem and “keeping Armenia and Azerbaijan on a short leash”. In other words, the Karabakh problem did not appear yesterday. Having established an Armenian state on Azerbaijani lands in 1918, the “church-party-Diaspora” triad revitalized the myth of a “Great Armenia from the sea to the sea”. Thus, the “hot” phase of the 1918-1920 period led to the alienation of Zangezur and Lake Goycha (Sevan), the westernmost lands of Karabakh, from Azerbaijan. The “cold” phase of 1920-1988 was marked by “creeping annexation” and repeated deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia. Another “hot” phase of 1988-1994 ended in the transformation of the NKAR into the Nagorno-Karabakh republic and Armenian occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts. “Hot” phases are characterized by Yerevan’s reliance on external forces. In 1918-1920, the Republic of Ararat relied heavily on General A. Denikin’s voluntary army, while in 1988-1994 Yerevan received weaponry and advice from abroad.

The second “hot” phase of the Karabakh problem started in 1988 and became the first ethnic and territorial conflict in the

USSR. The Karabakh problem was unprecedented in the Soviet space for the scale, brutality and duration of hostilities\textsuperscript{71}. In fact, the word “Karabakh” was also used figuratively to describe any armed conflict on the territory of the FSU. The Karabakh conflict became a syndrome as similar stand-offs appeared. It was turned into an instrument in the hands of the Armenians to scare away adversaries, a strong argument in political games of Armenian politicians, an important factor for the “church-party-Diaspora” triad which keeps on asking the international community for help in resolving the “Armenian issue”.

An opinion by a western expert should be viewed in this context: “I have reached two conclusions which some may view as disputable. The first is that the conflict was inevitable and would have occurred anyway. The formation of the NKAR led to political instability which could not but cause problems that started surfacing as soon as centralized Soviet system of power weakened. The second conclusion is that both sides wrongly blame the Kremlin for the start of the conflict. Reasons for the conflict should be sought at home”\textsuperscript{72}.

At the same time, the Karabakh problem has affected the Caucasus and global interests of many states: Russia and Georgia, Turkey and Iran, the USA and EU, China and Japan, the Arabic world, Pakistan and India, Afghanistan and South Korea. However, the settlement of the Karabakh problem depends only on a few of them. Judging by the developments, a delaying solution of the problem plays into the hands of key external players. Therefore, the Karabakh problem is likely to continue glowing like a fuse in the Caucasus powder keg until the key players find common ground.

The Karabakh problem is also at the centre of attention for the “church-party-Diaspora” triad, which is confirmed by the Armenian media\textsuperscript{73}. For instance, the Dashnaksutyn Party has stated

\textsuperscript{71} Thomas de Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan between peace and war: Translation from English. M., 2005. P. 7-8


\textsuperscript{73} Erkramas newspaper (Moscow). 2006. No. 1, 7, 9.
that “unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia is the best option”. On the occasion of its own anniversary, the party stated in an address to the Armenian people: “In the last 115 years we have covered a long road: struggle for the liberation of Artsakh, its independence, formation of the Artsakh army, struggle for the establishment of a democratic state... Our cooperation with the president of the Republic of Armenia started in 1990 when there was still a Soviet system in Artsakh74... We always stood by Artsakh and struggled for it... Artsakh, the struggle for its liberation have always been at the center of our cooperation, its driving force... Together with the president, we have not made any concessions in the Artsakh issue and achieved progress in the “motherland-Diaspora” system.

The Karabakh problem is discussed in the Caucasian Armenia not only on weekdays, but also during celebrations. Thus, in a speech on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of independence, R. Kocharyan, the then president of Armenia, said, “The Diaspora has made an invaluable contribution to the cause of state building; the relations with it have become mutually complementing. A fair solution to the Karabakh problem is still a priority. It can only be based on a recognition of and respect for Artsakh people’s right to self-determination. Nothing should endanger the independence and sustainable development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”75. In a message of congratulation to the Dashnaktsutyun Party on the same occasion, he wrote, “A free Artsakh has become a new Sardarapat76 on our road to independence”. The Karabakh problem is regularly tabled at various “Armenia-Dashnaktsutyun” forums. For instance, a Dashnaktsutyun representative told a 3rd forum in 2006, “Our meeting is yet another opportunity to talk about the struggle of Artsakh for liberation, about the importance to solving our nationwide problem. Artsakh is ours, and we can’t get tired or back down in this successful struggle”.

74 Robert Kocharyan, the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, the then President of the Republic of Armenia.
75 Erkramas. 2006. No. 1
76 The so-called battle of Sardarapat (May, 1918) in which Armenian troops “crushed” regular units of the Ottoman army.
In this connection, it might be worth recalling how the Azerbaijani city of Erivan, the capital of the former Azerbaijani Erivan khanate, became the capital of the Republic of Ararat (Armenia) in May 1918.

This event, truly historic for the Armenians, took place only thanks to the goodwill of the ADR leaders. Let’s refer to an official document concerning the matter\textsuperscript{77}.

MINUTES NO. 3
OF THE MEETING OF THE MUSLIM NATIONAL COUNCIL
HELD ON 29 MAY 1918 AT THE PALACE OF TIFLIS.

IN OPENING REMARKS, COUNCIL MEMBER F. KHOISKI INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE RESULTS OF TALKS OF COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE THOSE OF THE ARMENIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL REGARDING BORDERS OF THE AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIAN FEDERATIONS. F. KHOISKI ENDED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AN ARMENIAN FEDERATION, A POLITICAL CENTRE IS REQUIRED, AND THIS CAN ONLY BE ERIVAN AFTER THE JOINING OF ALEXANDROPOL TO TURKEY. THEREFORE, KHOISKI SAYS, THE PASSAGE OF ERIVAN TO THE ARMENIANS IS INEVITABLE.

ALSO SPEAKING ON THE ISSUE WERE KH. KHASMAMEDOV, M. JAFAROV, SHEIKHUL-ISLAMOV (ON BEHALF OF THE HUMMET PARTY), M. MAGERRAMOV (ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST MUSLIM BLOC), WHO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CESSION OF ERIVAN TO THE ARMENIANS WAS

A HISTORICAL NECESSITY AND INEVITABLE EVIL. 15 OUT OF 28 MEETING PARTICIPANTS VOTED FOR THE CESSION OF ERIVAN, ONE PERSON VOTED AND THREE ABSTAINED.

THEN THE ISSUE OF ESTABLISHING A CONFEDERATION WITH THE ARMENIANS WAS DISCUSSED. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THE MATTER WAS PUT TO THE VOTE. THIS STRUCTURE OF AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA WAS UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL. COUNCIL MEMBER F. PUT PROPOSED TO INCLUDE TEYMURBEK MAKINSKI ON THE NATIONAL COUNCIL BY WAY OF CO-OPTATION, AND THE DECISION WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED.

CHAIRMAN (SIGNATURE)
SECRETARY (SIGNATURE)

As is evident, on 29 May 1918, i.e. the day following the declaration of independence of the Northern Azerbaijan and the Caucasian Armenia, the Azerbaijan National Council made a generous gift to the Armenian National Council. On the same day, the friendly gesture was backed up by an instruction from Fatali-Khan Khoiski, Chairman of ADR Council of Ministers, to Mamed Hasan Hajinsky, the ADR Minister of Foreign Affairs, which said, “We have finished all the disputes with the Armenians, they will accept the ultimatum and end the war. We will cede Erivan to them”78.

However, the Armenian side did not appreciate the friendly step and territorial claims continued. The Armenians carried on insisting that Karabakh should be theirs. In this connection, on 31 July 1918 Fatali-Khan Khoiski sent a message to Mamed Amin Rasulzade, the head of the Azerbaijan delegation in Istanbul, which said, “I am sending you copies of maps with delineated borders of Azerbaijan as you requested. Please proceed from them in every possible way. If Armenians still lay claims to Karabakh, please refuse to cede Erivan and part of Gazakh District to them. If they stick to the verbal agreement we reached earlier, a part of the Erivan district, which is dotted on the map, can be ceded to them”79.

The documents mentioned indicate that the ADR was pursuing an amicable policy towards the Republic of Ararat and was even prepared to cede another part of its territory besides Erivan to the “fraternal” state. However, “the obstinate and unsociable neighbor” chose a military way. Both in 1918-1920, when it attacked not only Azerbaijan, but also Georgia to occupy territories that it considered disputable – Lori, Karabakh and Nakhchivan – and in 1988-1994 when it started war against Azerbaijan.

Therefore, “the Karabakh syndrome” demonstrates that the Armenians will never be content with what they have, even though Baku has repeatedly demonstrated peacefulness towards Caucasian Armenia. Here is another example.

In the ADR times, leaders of the Republic took an unprecedented step: in May 1918, thanks to their goodwill, the Republic of Ararat received the “political center” of Erivan as a gift from Baku. Such a center should have been Alexandropol (Gyumri at present), but it became part of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the ADR decided to cede Erivan: as indicated in Minutes No. 3 of a meeting of the Azerbaijan National Council from 29 May 1918, “this was a historical necessity and inevitable evil”. Otherwise, Istanbul was threatening Baku with war.

In Soviet times, Baku agreed to the establishment of the NKAR. There were Armenian departments at schools and universities; newspapers, magazines and books were published in Armenian; there was a whole district of Baku called Armenikend; there was an Armenian theatre named after Sundukyan in the center of Baku; Armenians used to hold various senior positions ranging from secretaries at the Central Committee of the Communist Party to ministers.

In this regard, let’s have a look at the following:

1. Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenian scholars persistently call Artsakh, is a territory belonging to Azerbaijani history. Place name “Artsakh” is of Alban origin. In the modern Udi language of the Caucasian family, one of the Caucasian Albania languages, the verb *artsesun* means “to sit, to sit down”. Hence the form of the verb *artsi*, which means “settled; or leading a settled way
of life” is derived\textsuperscript{80}. Place name \textit{Artsakh}, which is derived form \textit{artsi} and suffix \textit{akh} is in the same line. It is a place name with a plural suffix (collectiveness). There are still dozens of place names with suffixes \textit{–akh, -ekh, -ikh, -ukh, -yikh, -yukh} in the Caucasus. They are typical of Caucasian languages\textsuperscript{81}. For example, \textit{Adi-yukh, Ants-ukh, Botl-ikh, Darb-akh, Datt-yikh, Jin-ikh, Dusr-akh, Kazikum-ukh, Kar-akh, Kass-akh, Kum-ukh, Kafirkum-ukh, Kur-akh, Mar-ukh, Matr-akh, Mikr-akh, Mos-akh, Nedr-akh, Necheps-ukh, Ob-okh, Psed-ekh, Surkh-akh, Tabakh, Tep-ukh, Ukr-ukh, Ur-akh, Urkar-akh, Ur-ukh, Khaar-akh, Khi-akh, Khind-akh, Khunz-akh, Catan-ikh, Chir-akh, Shin-akh.\textit{In Northern Azerbaijan, where Alban tribes belonging to Azerbaijani ancestors, including modern Udis, Budukhs, Qrizs, Khinalugs, Ingiloys, etc. are recorded, place names with the same suffixes are still present: Az-yikh, Arts-akh, Jimjim-akh, Kokhmukh, Kurm-ukh, Mamr-ukh, Mukh-akh, Sam-ukh, Shad-ukh}\textsuperscript{82}.

2. Erivan is an Azerbaijani city which happened to become part of the Republic of Ararat. If the Ottoman army hadn’t seized Alexandropol (Gyumri at present), the only city in the South Caucasus seized by the Dashnaks that was to become their capital, they would not have received Erivan.

3. Nearly a century ago, shortly before World War One, Stepan Shaumyan, a well-known Armenian chauvinist and Bolshevik leader of Baku, wrote, “Nations have mingled with each other so much that there are no national territories within which federative autonomous districts could be established”\textsuperscript{83}. Despite this, the NKAR was established in 1923 in order to preserve “peace and accord” between the Armenians and Azerbaijani. It is not very


\textsuperscript{82} Dictionary of geographical terms and other words found in place names of the Azerbaijan SSR / Composed by E. Bushuyeva. M., 1971.

important in the context of the Karabakh syndrome whether Shaumyan was right or wrong. It is much more significant that the establishment of the NKAR, effectively a second Armenian state within Azerbaijani territory, was an artificial step which proved to be highly explosive. This was confirmed by further developments: the establishment of a self-styled Nagorno-Karabakh republic (NKR), deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia, occupation of Azerbaijani districts. Established in this way, the NKR has a military basis. Napoleon once said about such form of governance, “One can do a lot with the bayonet, but not sit on it”.

4. As for the Karabakh problem in general, there is certainly a hugely important geopolitical factor in its settlement. A complex game involving outside players has been under way around Karabakh and in the Caucasus in general for many years. This game actually represents an open rivalry between the USA and Russia for influence in the region. For Moscow, the Caucasus is a gate to the south, to the Middle East; the USA is interested in advancing in the same direction, where there is an important transit corridor to the Asia-Pacific region which plays an ever-increasing role in the economic, oil, military, commercial and transport system. Other players include the European Union, Iran, Turkey, China, India, Pakistan, Arab states, Japan, South Korea. This game is being played both transparently (a minor part) and latently (mostly). Therefore, it can be said that Armenia and Azerbaijan are hostages of a great geopolitical game of important players such as the USA, Russia, Western Europe and Iran, Turkey and China, the Arab world and the South-East Asia.

Proceeding from the above, it can be concluded that the political situation around the Karabakh problem remains vague. Accordingly, the Karabakh syndrome, which combines both internal and external factors, will continue to be on the agenda for a long time to come. In fact, this conclusion holds true not only for the situation around Karabakh, but also for the states directly or indirectly involved in the problem because the problem has political, territorial, ethnic and confessional nature. In particular, the following factors may be indicated:

- Domestic processes in societies of both the parties of the
• Influence of key external players, i.e. superpowers;
• Position of major states bordering on parties of the conflict;
• Rivalry of geopolitical players for the Caucasus.

However, the influence of key external players is the main factor on which a Karabakh settlement depends. After all, it is the superpowers that can finally decide on peace or resumption of hostilities because the Karabakh problem is an integral part of geopolitics.

At the same time, there are about 50 situations similar to the Karabakh problem in the world. All of them are being dealt with almost without the participation of the affected states, for even an ordinary negotiating process quickly turns into rivalry between superpowers. At the same time, neighbors do play a role, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, Yerevan’s “ally”, and Turkey, a fraternal state for Baku. Thus, back in 2006 Tehran displayed “a certain interest in developing political processes around the Karabakh settlement” which manifested itself through regular consultations at the level of diplomats and political figures of the two states. As for Ankara, it signed a letter of intent with Yerevan in October 2009 whereby the Armenian side succeeded in avoiding the Karabakh problem. Much more important documents were also signed, including those “On the establishment of diplomatic relations” and “On the development of bilateral relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey”.

In this connection, it might be worth recalling a view of a Western expert who comes from the Caucasus and is, therefore, well aware of the regional situation. It is indicative that his words apply to the Karabakh problem. “The tragedy of Armenia is not in the fact that Stalin included Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 1923, but in the fact that Lenin occupied and annexed independent republics of the Caucasus in 1920”.

ARMENIAN AND GEORGIAN COLLISIONS

Negative trends in Georgian-Armenian relations date back to the late 19th century when Armenians appeared in the South Caucasus in great numbers. And the trends are still ongoing and relate to territorial, cultural, confessional and historical problems.

In Georgia, Armenians are an ethnic and confessional minority. They mainly live in Tbilisi, Javakheti, Abkhazia and Adzharia. Relations between Tbilisi and ethnic Armenians living in the Georgian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti became strained in the 1990s. The jurisdiction of central authorities here is still limited. After bitter experience of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which had negative consequences for Tbilisi, the latter prefers to abstain from any dramatic actions in the largely Armenian-populated Javakheti region. Things are further aggravated by the problem of Meskhetian Turks aspiring to return to this region which they see as their historical homeland.

Located in the country’s south-west, the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti is one of Georgia’s biggest administrative units and a key geopolitical and geo-economic region of the South Caucasus. A section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which starts

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in Azerbaijan and ends in Turkey, runs through the region. Turkey had been an Armenian “enemy” until October 2009, so the Samtskhe-Javakheti Armenians can always commit an act of terror on this section of the strategic pipeline. The Akhalkalaki-Kars railway line, which will run to Turkey, is also expected to pass through Samtskhe-Javakheti, which makes Armenian acts of terror possible here too. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, also ending in Turkey, is also threatened by the Armenians. Armenian terrorism may manifest itself on the Baku-Batumi-Supsa oil pipeline as well.

Ethnic Armenians have lived in Georgia for more than 180 years. After a successful war with the Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829, the Russian Empire occupied the Black Sea coast from Kuban to Poti and a major part of Meskheti and Javakheti. This is when it embarked on a settlement of Ottoman Armenians in the South Caucasus. In Georgia, the migrants settled down in Akhalkalaki district (Javakheti) and soon exceeded the Georgians in number. The process of “Armenianization” lasted until the 20th century and affected not only Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, but also Abkhazia, Adzharia and Borchali, Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Gori, Borjomi and Batum. An active role in the process was played by Dashnaksutyn which was governed by the “Great Armenian from the sea to the sea” myth. Now the plan was to include the Akhalkalaki district in the “Great Armenia”. Therefore, after the establishment of the Republic of Ararat in 1918, its ruling Dashnaksutyn Party and the Armenian National Council in Georgia were conducting secret anti-Georgian activities. One of their consequences was Yerevan’s war with Georgia which started on 7 December 1918 and aimed at seizing Javakheti and Lori. The attempt failed.

However, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Armenian scholars, proceeding from conjured-up theories, laid claims to Javakheti. “Armenians have populated the region since ancient

90 Ditto. P. 99.
91 Ditto. P. 104-111.
times because the territory was part of historical Armenia”\textsuperscript{93}. In connection with this, the Dashnarksutyn Party held a conference “Javakhk\textsuperscript{94} facing 21\textsuperscript{st} century challenges” in February 2005. It was stated there that, “the Javakheti issue is not only the self-determination and preservation of Armenian cultural values, but first of all the preservation of Armenianism. There must be an Armenian representative office here, the Georgian eparchy of Echmiadzin must have a legal status. At the same time, an autonomy for Javakheti Armenians is not a goal in itself but a means of preservation of the local Armenian population. Therefore, the shortest way to resolve the problem is to create a Georgian federation within which Javakheti will have the status of a constituent territory”\textsuperscript{95}.

In September 2005, a regular conference of Armenian organizations of Javakheti was held in Akhalkalaki as part of the “Integration, not assimilation” initiative. It focuses on the status of Javakhhk within the state structure of Georgia. The decision was made that Tbilisi must “provide the status of autonomy to a number of Armenian-populated regions”; “provision of an autonomy to the Georgian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti was in interests of Georgia” and is “an important geopolitical factor in the whole of the South Caucasus”\textsuperscript{96}. The conference also stated that the implementation of its resolutions by Tbilisi would facilitate realization of the dream of “many generations of Javakhk’s Armenian population”; that “for Armenia the autonomy of Javakhhk would certainly be an important positive factor” because “this status will always be a factor of constructive influence on Armenia on Georgia” and “joint influence of Armenia and Georgia on Azerbaijan and Turkey”. It will also help attract “significant investment of the Armenian Diaspora” to Javakheti\textsuperscript{97}.

Thus, the problem of Javakheti, just like Nagorno-Karabakh, is discussed by the Armenian movement from the standpoint of the “church-party-Diaspora” triad. In other words, the church

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{93} S. Minasyan, The socio-economic and political situation in Javakheti // Central Asia and the Caucasus. Lulea, Sweden, 2005. No. 3. P. 170; Erkramas. 2006. No. 7.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{94} This is how Armenians call Javakheti.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{95} Erkramas. 2006. No. 2.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{96} Ditto. No. 6.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{97} Ditto.}
is involved as an ideological center, the party as a champion of ideas, and the Diaspora as a sponsor. Speculating on the current aggravation of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, Yerevan has joined the problem by extensively mulling the Javakheti factor. Thus, “it stresses a huge Armenian contribution to the development of Georgian statehood and culture for centuries”.

Let’s recall a curious fact. Ivan Javakhishvili, an outstanding Georgian academician, wrote in his report to the Georgian government in 1926: “Samtskhe, Javakheti, Erusheti and Palakatsio inhabited by the Georgians of Muslim faith (Meskhetian Turks – author) since 1828 were captured from the Turks by Russia. The population of the said regions was driven into such a state of mind that it chose to abandon the lands of their ancestors and move to Turkey. Earl Paskevich did not allow the Georgians from Imereti to migrate here and instead moved 30,000 Armenians from Turkey... Thanks to Russian officials, Meskheti, where the Georgians had made up more than 90 per cent of the population before 1828, was predominantly populated by the Armenians in 1930” 98.

The process of Georgia’s Armenianization was gradual, consistent and systematic. As a result, the number of ethnic Armenians living there reached 122,000 in 1865 and 197,000 in 1897. Another 55,000 Armenians were settled there in 1897-1902. A total of 252,000 Armenians lived in Georgia in the early 20th century, including 124,900, i.e. more than half, in Tbilisi, while the rest in Borchali, an Azerbaijani region within Georgia 99. Therefore, “the process was carried out consistently and envisaged the settlement of borderline districts so that they could subsequently be annexed to Armenia” 100. The new settlers were “destroying churches, towers, fortresses, ruins, desecrating monasteries, plundering sacred images and shattering the peace of local ancestors” 101.


100 Ditto. P. 112.

It should also be indicated that, according to Armenians, “there are still unresolved religious discrepancies between Armenian and Georgian churches”\(^ {102}\). They started over 1,300 years ago when the Armenian Church attempted to subordinate the Georgian one to itself\(^ {103}\).

After the establishment of Soviet rule in the South Caucasus, Yerevan submitted yet another project to Moscow in 1922, requesting that a large part of Javakheti be joined to Borchali district populated by an Azerbaijani majority and also inhabited by Armenians. The aim being pursued was to create an Armenian administrative unit. According to Javakhishvili, “it is obvious that this plan was the first step in a cunning project on separating the two districts from Georgia and annexing them to Armenia. The second step was to follow shortly afterwards. Suffice it to look through the maps prepared by the Dashnaks to see that struggle for the same goals was still under way, but this time different means were engaged”\(^ {104}\). However, that attempt was doomed to fail as well.

According to a USSR population census of 1989, Georgia was home to 437,211 Armenians (8.1 per cent of the country’s population)\(^ {105}\). The biggest Armenian community of about 200,000 people lived in Javakheti. According to official Georgian sources, Armenians made up 91.3 per cent of the local population\(^ {106}\). Armenian political party “Virk”\(^ {107}\) was established here and demanded autonomy for Javakhk. Armenians held senior posts in the region: heads of executive authority, the police, court, etc. In 1990, the party prepared a draft resolution on the provision of Javakheti with “the status of a constituent region of the Georgian state”\(^ {108}\).


\(^{103}\) I. Javakhov, History of church disruption between Georgia and Armenia in the early 7\(^{th}\) century // Info AS. S. Petersburg, 1908. Series VI No. 5-6.


\(^{107}\) The name of Georgia in medieval Armenians records.

The secessionist movement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR, which manifested itself openly in 1988, initiated the establishment of an Armenian nationalist movement in Javakheti. The Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-1993 became some sort of a catalyst in the process. And when hostilities triggered by Yerevan flared up in Nagorno-Karabakh, many volunteers from Javakheti rushed here. In this connection, Filaret Berikyan, who handled Karabakh issues on behalf of the Armenian government for four years, stated, “Armenians of Javakheti have a very high national self-consciousness. There were very many of them in Karabakh, they even formed their own units”\(^{109}\).

Therefore, it was not by chance that a “Javakhk” committee appeared in Javakheti on 5 February 1988, a week after the start of the Karabakh movement in Armenia. Its objective was to support “Karabakh brothers”. In April-May 1988, the committee grew into a “Javakhk Popular Movement” (JPM) which quickly became political and military. This was facilitated by the developments unfolding in Georgia and the activities of the “church-party-Diaspora” triad. As a result, the JPM currently has its own armed units and authority in Javakheti. In November 1991, an ethnic Armenian became the head of the JPM authority. The official goals of the JPM are “to preserve Armenian cultural heritage and science, to teach Armenian history at local schools, to protect national interests and develop the region”. The actual objective is, of course, the annexation of the region to Armenia\(^{110}\). This is exactly why the Council of authorized representatives of the Armenian population of Javakheti spoke in favor of “Javakheti’s independence”.

Analysts believe that Tbilisi is unlikely to provide the Armenians of Javakheti with an autonomy. Georgian authorities are well aware that conflicts often break out in autonomous regions, no matter how formal they may have been in the Soviet time. The best examples of that in the South Caucasus include Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adzharia. In other words, the autonomy of Javakheti will create “a new Karabakh”, this time in Georgia\(^{111}\). Meanwhile, JPM leaders are stating, “We will not follow the path

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\(^{109}\) V. Guretski/F. Berikyan interview. Yerevan, August 28, 1997 // V. Guretski.


\(^{111}\) www.abkhaziainfo.f20.org/analytics.shtml.
of Nagorno-Karabakh. We would like to enjoy the rights ethnic minorities have in civilized countries of the world, as well as guarantees that these rights will be observed”112. However, judging by the developments, the JPM plans are of separatist nature because Armenians of Javakheti have “a successful” example of Nagorno-Karabakh.

It is also worth mentioning that besides the JPM, Armenians of Javakheti have a military organization “Parvants”113. The JPM proper has 5,000 militants, while its radical leaders are always at the beck and call of the Armenian triad. In general, the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia threaten Georgia and “instigate” Armenian separatism in Javakheti114.

The importance Yerevan attaches to Javakheti is confirmed by the fact that the Armenian Prime Minister has a special adviser on Javakheti. This adviser has stated recently, “The population can see that it can’t take part in governing the region. People are beginning to think that they must resolve their problems on their own. The attempts to make the Georgian government tackle the socioeconomic problems of the region are proving futile because the authorities are too suspicious of sinister repercussions of separatism”115.

One of the leaders of the local Armenian organization “Virk” agrees with him. He has expressed support for an autonomy, for “we haven’t seen any practical steps from the authorities ... for 10-12 years”116. Apparently, Yerevan has already “resolved” the problem of Javakheti, as it did with Karabakh earlier, in its favor. It is not by chance that emissaries of Yerevan have been saying after visiting Javakheti: “While in Akhalkalaki, one may forget that he is not in Armenia – the Armenian language and music are

113  Armenians way of calling Lake Paravani in Georgia.
116  Ditto.
everywhere. Only Georgian number plates on vehicles suggest that Akhalkalaki belongs to Georgia.”117. At the same time, officials from the Republic of Armenia are threatening that if Georgia resorts to forceful methods, “Yerevan will not remain indifferent to the fate of its compatriots living in Javakheti”118. Armenian radical political structures, first of all, the Dashnaktsutiyn Party, as well as official representatives of Yerevan, are also interfering in the Javakheti problem119. Thus, it was stated at the 29th Congress of Dashnaktsutiyn (February 2004): “We have always valued our friendship with Georgia and may express our interest in Georgia’s territorial integrity if the authorities of this country realize that they may jeopardize the interests of entire Georgia by rejecting autonomy demands from the Armenians of Javakhk”. The Dashnaktsutiyn Party’s program unequivocally states that Javakheti must become part of the Republic of Armenia. This idea is also proclaimed in the program of “Javakhk”.

Therefore, the inspired Armenians of Javakheti and their organizations are urging the Georgian government “to give Javakheti (with its current borders) and the adjoining Kvemo-Kartli (i.e. the Azerbaijani district of Borchali – M.M.), mostly populated by the Armenians, the status of an autonomous region of Georgia with extensive self-government authority, including the right to be elected to local governments, and to make the Armenian language the second official language of the region”120.

Thus, Javakheti is gradually transforming, albeit latently, into an Armenian settlement on Georgian territory, while Tbilisi’s authority over it is as virtual as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

It is worth indicating that the province of Kvemo-Kartli claimed by the Armenians is a historically Azerbaijani region of

117  www.mediakavkaz.by.ru.
Borchali which was and still is populated by an Azerbaijani majority. This is how it became part of Georgia. In 1736, Nadir Shah Afshar took over several districts, including Borchali, from his political rival Beylerbey Ziyad oglu of Ganja in revenge for the latter’s failure to attend his crowning. He then presented the districts to his vassal, Tsar Constantine of Kartli-Kakheti. Later, up until the establishment of Soviet rule in the Caucasus, these lands often changed hands. When the Soviet government announced the establishment of “peace and order” in the Caucasus and refused to revise the borders again, Borchali was part of Georgia. It is still there now. The province of Kvemo-Kartli, as this historically Azerbaijani area is called now, has a mostly Azerbaijani population numbering around 500,000 people. They are Georgia’s biggest ethnic minority. Armenian leaders of Javakheti are trying to set Tbilisi against Baku in an attempt to derive their own benefit over Kvemo-Kartli. For instance, participants of a third congress of local Armenian organizations in September 2005 voiced concern over the growing number of Azerbaijanis in Georgia. The “peacemakers” want to undermine Azerbaijani-Georgian relations and lay the groundwork for the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Georgia.

Besides “Javakhk”, “Virk” and “Dashnaksutyun”, there are other Armenian nationalist groups in Javakheti, such as “the Union of Georgian Armenians”, “the committee on assistance programs to Javakheti”, a local branch of “the Armenian Assistance Union”. They all work in one direction. Therefore, the address of the Dashnaksutyun Party to the Armenian people over the 115th anniversary of the party says: “The problem of Javakheti is the problem of all Armenian people”; the Armenians of Javakhk demand autonomy and the party supports the idea; there are 250,000 Armenians in Javakhk; Javakhk is “our homeland, a piece of our heart and soul. It will never be alone in its struggle.

123 Erkramas. 2006. No. 11.
124 Ditto.
Armenian people will always be supporting it"125.

The “United Javakhk” alliance and the “Virk” party demand that an end be put to the discrimination of Armenians in Javakheti; that the Armenian language receive the status of a state language together with Georgian; that Armenian-language teaching be preserved at Georgia’s Armenian schools; that the “history of Armenian people” be incorporated in the curriculum of Armenian schools in Georgia; and the “Virk” Party be registered126. Yerevan has allocated $350,000 in assistance to the Armenians of Javakheti.

Thus, the “church-party-Diaspora” triad, by speculating on “the problem of Javakheti”, believes that the problem is as significant for the Armenians as Karabakh. It is not by chance that the Dashnaktsutyun Party wrote in its address to the Armenian people in 2005: “The President and the party have managed to avoid any concessions in the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh – M.M.) issue, reached progress in the “homeland-Diaspora” system and treated the Javakhk issue with special attention (the reference is to the ex-president of the Republic of Armenia and former leader of the NKAR, R. Kocharyan - M.M.)”127.

In other words, the Armenians do not care much about whose lands, Muslim or Christian, Armenians can occupy. Any territory would do to make the “Great Armenia” myth come true.

In conclusion of the chapter let’s recall the words of a prominent Georgian writer and humanist, I. Chavchavadze wrote in his book Armenian Scholars and Crying Stones in the early 20th century what Armenians did to the Georgian cultural heritage in the 19th century. Chavchavadze completes his work with a remarkable appeal to the Armenians of Georgia: “No matter whether we had much or little, we provided you with a shelter and treated you like brothers. So don’t treat us like enemies in our own home! It is better to have a lion sitting in your way than an enemy in your home. Georgians used to say so long ago, so do we and so will any reasonable Armenian.”128.

125  Ditto.
128  I. Chavchavadze, Armenian scholars and crying stones. P. 123.
WHY ARE ARME N IA N S NOT CAUCASIANS?

The political situation in the South Caucasus before the 19th century was quite complicated. Of the 20 Azerbaijani khanates, particularly significant and influential were the khanates of Baku, Ganja, Karabakh, Guba, Urmia and Sheki. They had their own dynasties and administration, army and mints. The khanate of Baku (1747-1806) was playing an important part in the South Caucasus and on the Caspian coast. Its capital Baku was an important commercial center, the main Caspian port and the junction of trade and transit roads. The khanate of Ganja (1736-1804) repeatedly repelled the attacks of the Karabakh khanate and Kartli-Kakheti. Javad Khan, the Khan of Ganja (1785-1804), was a prominent state and military figure of the time. The khanate of Karabakh (1747-1822) was engaged in an active external policy, for it had to rebuff repeated attacks from Iran and neighboring khanates. Therefore, Ibrahimkhalil Khan, the Khan of Karabakh (1763-1806), was in a military alliance with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. The khanate of Guba (1724-1813) was the most powerful and influential. Its outstanding leader was Fatali Khan (1758-1789), whose aim was to unite Azerbaijan under his umbrella. To do that, he concluded an alliance with the Khan of Sheki and Dagestan rulers. As a result, he subdued the territories along the Caspian coast and seized the khanates of Derbent, Baku, Shemakha and Javad. This led to the establishment of a North-Eastern Azerbaijani state. The Khanate of Urmia (1747-1830) with the capital in Tabriz, an important trade, commercial and political center, was founded by Fa-

tali Khan (1747-1763). He was conducting an active foreign policy and expanding his possessions. He was the first Azerbaijani khan to attempt to unite the entire Azerbaijan under the dominion of one ruler. Fatali khan Afshar subordinated the Khoy, Karadagh, Maraga and Sarab khanates to himself. He made raids on the Erivan and Karabakh khanates and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Haji Chelebi khan (1743-1819) of Sheki conducted successful raids against the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. In 1768, Huseyn khan of Sheki (1759-1780) concluded a military and political alliance with the Khan of Guba as the two jointly attacked the khanate of Shemakha and divided its territory.

Under such military and political circumstances in the South Caucasus, the Russian Empire, aspiring to take control over the entire Caucasus, was facing several strategic tasks. First, it was necessary was to neutralize Azerbaijani khanates. Second, it wanted to find a satellite factor which would facilitate the development of regained territories of the Caucasus. Thirdly, this is why the Russian Empire was looking for eastern Christians who would help it realize its plans in the South Caucasus. The Armenians, who lived mainly in the Ottoman Empire and Iran until the early 19th century, fit into the plan. After losing their statehood for the fourth time in the 11th century, they ended up in the Diaspora (Spiurk). Living in Ottoman and Iranian lands for centuries, Armenians learned local languages and customs, but also preserved their own Christianity and self-consciousness. The entire credit for that should be given to the Gregorian Church, which, in the ab-


sence of an Armenian statehood for many centuries, was the only factor preserving the Armenian language and literature, ideology and science, mentality and self-consciousness.

It was for these reasons that the Russian Empire, competing with Ottoman sultans and Iranian shahs for the Caucasus, decided to use Armenians and their church in its own strategic interests. In the early 19th century, it waged two victorious wars with the Iranian state (1804-1813 and 1826-1628) and two with the Ottoman Empire (1806-1812 and 1828-1829). One of the key results of the two treaties signed at the end of the wars – the Russian-Iranian Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) and the Russian-Ottoman Treaty of Adrianople (1829) – was the mass resettlement of Ottoman and Iranian Armenians to the Caucasus, mainly to the South Caucasus and Northern Azerbaijan, which started in the early 19th century. It was then that all 11 Northern Azerbaijani khanates were abolished and became districts of the Russian Empire. Therefore, the process of Armenian settlement in Northern Azerbaijan was conducted peacefully and supervised by Russian authorities. As we mentioned earlier, an Armenian district was established at the expense of Azerbaijan’s Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates.

In connection with the above it should also be noted that the appearance of Armenians in Asia, including the Caucasus, is a long territorial and chronological process of migration which started on the European continent. Therefore, “one of the main subjects of Armenian studies is the resettlement of Armenians from native lands”\(^\text{132}\). These words by a modern Armenian scholar are perhaps the best description of the “painful” topic of Armenian studies since the start of the search for “a homeland of the Armenian people”. The process began long ago but is still ongoing. The search led Armenian scholars to discover 26 “Armenias” in Asia Minor, what has been mentioned above. Unable to choose one, they found a way out by creating the “Great Armenia” myth of many virtual “Armenias”\(^\text{133}\).

\(^{132}\) V. Arutyunova-Fidanian, Narration about Armenian affairs. 7th century. P. 68.

For the reasons mentioned above, the slogan “Armenia, Armenia! Our homeland, our land!” which Armenians frequently chant is not quite clear. One is tempted to ask what particular “Armenia” is meant not by ordinary Armenians, but by great representatives of Armenianism such as “the father of Armenian history” Moses Khorenatsi, poet Avetik Isaakyan, artist Martiros Saryan, writer William Saroyan. There is another question comes that to mind: if Armenians are so patriotic, then why do they live mainly abroad? It is well known that Armenians have lived away from home since early Middle Ages.

Today, there are 7 million Armenians in the world\(^{134}\) and they live in over 70 countries. According to the Ministry of Statistics of the Republic of Armenia, 3,803,400 people lived in Armenia as of 1 January 2000\(^{135}\), while other sources suggest that there were 2,500,000 people left in Armenia by 1994\(^{136}\). According to British weekly *The Economist*, a total of 750,000 Armenians emigrated from the country in 1993\(^{137}\). In the opinion of E. Khojabekian, “the situation in Armenia over the last 10-15 years has made it is impossible to define a specific number of people living in the country and produce a demographic picture”\(^{138}\). The same author points to a “reduction in the natural population growth” and “an unprec-
edented rate of migration”\textsuperscript{139}.

At present, Armenians have settlements in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan Republic). Before the collapse of the USSR, 390,505 Armenians lived in Northern Azerbaijan\textsuperscript{140}, including 137,000 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR\textsuperscript{141}. Armenians live in the following countries of the world: Russia – 533,000, USA – 700,000, France – 270,000, Iran – 200,000, Syria – 150,000, Lebanon – 150,000, Turkey – 150,000, Argentine – 70,000, Ukraine – 54,000, Uzbekistan – 50,000, Turkmenistan – 32,000, Bulgaria – 25,000, Canada – 20,000, Iraq – 20,000, Kazakhstan – 19,000, Australia – 16,000, Greece – 15,000, Egypt – 15,000, Uruguay – 15,000, Great Britain – 15,000, Kuwait – 10,000, Romania – 6,000\textsuperscript{142}. The political, territorial and ethno-confessional developments in the history of the Armenian people are related to a number of significant factors. It is perhaps for this reason that Armenian scholars, starting from the times of “the father of Armenian history” Moses Khorenatsi (5\textsuperscript{th} century), have not been writing “a history of Armenia” as a territory, but the history of the Armenian people. Thus, Moses Khorenatsi wrote a “History of the Armenians” (“Hayots Patmutyun”)\textsuperscript{143}. Subsequently, however, the research was often described as the “History of Armenia”, without specifying though which of the 26 “Armenias” it was dealing with. In Soviet times, scholars reverted to the “original source” and there appeared a series of publications on the “History of the Armenian people”. This tradition was preserved in the post-Soviet period.

\textsuperscript{139} V. Khojabekyan, Demography and employment in Armenia. From the early 19\textsuperscript{th} to mid-21\textsuperscript{st} centuries. Yerevan, 2006. P. 470.
\textsuperscript{141} National economy of the Azerbaijan SSR by the 70\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Great October. Anniversary statistical digest. Baku, 1987. P. 270.
too, as the “History of the Armenian people” was published in Yerevan in 2003\textsuperscript{144}. Otherwise, it would be impossible to present a theory that cannot be specified or attributed to any of the 26 “Armenias”\textsuperscript{145}. Naturally, there have been instances when a “History of Armenia” was published as well, and this referred to the “Caucasian Armenia” although it never covered the history of the Armenian people\textsuperscript{146}.

Sometimes Armenian scholars falsify both the names and content of works in the original language, which is Alban in this particular case. The language was used in the Azerbaijani state of Albania (3\textsuperscript{rd} century B.C. – 7\textsuperscript{th} century A.D.) and in ancient Armenian translations. They have not survived to the present day in the original language and are in ancient Armenian for reasons known too well\textsuperscript{147}. Here are some of them:

- The “History of Albanians” by 8\textsuperscript{th} century Alban author Moses Kaghankatouatsi has reached us in ancient Armenian. In 1861, Armenian scholar K. Patkanyan published this research in his own translation into Russian\textsuperscript{148}. In 1984, when the research was released in Russian translation with comments by S. Smbatyan, it was edited and “slightly” Armenianized even though we are talking about an Azerbaijani state of Albania. In fact, both the name of the author and the title of the work were distorted\textsuperscript{149}.

- The Russian version of the code of laws by Alban author Mkhit’ar Gos, which has survived to the present day in ancient Armenian, was described as \textit{Armenian Code of Laws}\textsuperscript{150}, even

\textsuperscript{144} History of the Armenian people in questions and answers. Yerevan, 2003.
\textsuperscript{148} The History of the Caucasian Albanians by Moses Kaghankatouatsi, 10th century writer. S. Petersburg, 1861.
though it contains legal canons of the Azerbaijani state of Albania.

- 13th century Alban author Kirakos Gandzaketsi wrote a *History*, which was published in the Russian language by T. Ter-Grigoryan in 1947\textsuperscript{151}. Almost 30 years later, it was republished in Russian translation by L. Khanlaryan and was named *History of Armenia*, although it wasn’t about the same “country”\textsuperscript{152}.

After the break-up of the USSR in 1991, Armenians published a new version of their history. However, they did not venture to call it the “History of Armenia” and gave it a poetic name, *Ancestry of Hayk*, a mythical forefather of the Armenian people. It was noted in a sub-headline that the work was about Armenia, though no detail was provided of the place name\textsuperscript{153}.

It is noteworthy that over the decades of manipulation with the geographical notion of “Armenia”, Armenian scholars developed a cliché which helps them avoid localizing the virtual “Armenia” in publications. Laymen can hardly determine the location of the country called “Armenia”.


In connection with the above, a rhetorical or indeed a sacramental question arises: why do Armenian scholars write the “History of the Armenian people” as an ethnicity, not the “History of Armenia” as country?

- One of the most celebrated Armenian scholars, researcher of the Byzantine Empire, full member of the Imperial Russian Archeological Society, Professor of St Petersburg University and the University of Brussels, researcher


\textsuperscript{152} Kirakos Gandzaketsi History of Armenia. M., 1976.

\textsuperscript{153} See: G. Sarkisyan, K. Khudaverdyan, K. Yuzbashyan, Ancestry of Hayk. Essay on the history and culture of Armenia from ancient times to the formation of the Third Republic.
of problems of medieval political, economic, social, cultural and confessional life of the Armenian people, N. Adonts (1871-1942)\textsuperscript{154}, wrote more than 100 years ago, “In the 8th century B.C., under pressure from Scythians or the Saka from the east, Cimmerians moved westwards, to the banks of the Danube, entered Thrace and, by taking Thracian tribes with them (including Phryges and Armenians), headed for Asia Minor”\textsuperscript{155}. Further, Adonts wrote: “Herodotus considers Armenians as having come from Phrygia”\textsuperscript{156}. In other words, before the 8th century B.C. Armenian ancestors lived in the historical area of Thrace in the Balkans, i.e. in Europe, from where they migrated, together with Cimmerian tribes, to Thrace in Anatolia, i.e. to Asia. Thus, during the migration of “peoples of the Sea”, the “Armens” entered Asia Minor to gether with relative tribes from the Balkans. Then, they proceeded farther to Armenian highlands (eastern part of Asia Minor – M.M.)\textsuperscript{157}. Therefore, Adonts goes on, “based on this evidence, researchers believe that Armenians belong to Phrygian tribes who used to live in Thrace. It is also believed that, seized by the Cimmerian movement, Armenians moved from there to Asia Minor and then, after breaking away from their Phrygian kinsmen, moved forward and settled down in the upper reaches of the Alys River on the right side of the Euphrates”\textsuperscript{158}.

- According to the “father of history”, 5th century B.C. Greek author Herodotus, Armenian ancestors lived north of Assyrians, i.e. up of the Euphrates, in Phrygian territory\textsuperscript{159}.
- Ancient Greek geographer and historian Strabo (1st

\textsuperscript{156} Ditto.
\textsuperscript{157} History of Armenian people. 1980. P.27.
\textsuperscript{159} Herodotus. I:180, 194; III:93; V:49, 52; VII:73.
century B.C. – 1st century A.D.) suggested that Armenians originated from Armenion, a historical region of Thessaly in Northern Greece.¹⁶⁰

- Russian 19th century researcher of the Caucasus, I. Chopin, also considered “Armenians as newcomers (in the Caucasus. – M.M.). They are related to Phrygians and Ionians who moved to the northern valleys of Anatolian Mountains”¹⁶¹.

- Prominent Armenian linguist and historian, Academician G. Kapantsian (1887-1957), while describing the territory occupied by Armenian ancestors in Asia Minor, wrote in the first half of the 20th century: “The country of Hayasa-Azzi was mainly located between the upper reaches of the Euphrates (Karasu), the Ch’orokhi and the Aras”¹⁶².

- Well-known Armenian philologist, expert in literature and linguist, Academician of the Armenian Academy of Sciences M. Abegian (1865-1944)¹⁶³ wrote in the latter half of the 20th century: “Armenian ancestors lived in Europe long before our era, near Phrygians and Thracians. From there they moved to Asia Minor, where they may have lived near Phrygians for some time, because Greek writer Herodotus considers them a colony originating from the Phrygians. This indicates that back at the times of Herodotus, the 5th century B.C., it was clear that Armenians had come to their country from the west”¹⁶⁴.

- Outstanding historian, philologist and linguist I. Dyakonov, based on an analysis of ancient Armenian lan-

¹⁶⁰ Strabo. XI:503.
Why are Armenians not Caucasians?

guage, denies its Urartian nature and considers that “the Proto-Armenian language, linguistic ancestor of ancient Armenian, could only be Indo-European, which is not related to Hurrit-Urartian, Hattic, modern Caucasian languages or Semitic languages”\(^{165}\). He adds that “since ancient Armenian is not related to the languages of the autochthons of Armenian highlands, Hurrits and Urartians, it is obvious that it comes from outside”\(^{166}\).

- In the late the 20\(^{th}\) century, Armenian scholars wrote, “The Armenian homeland, a place where they emerged as a separate people is the Armenian highlands”\(^{167}\), i.e. eastern part of Asia Minor.

- As I. Magakyan writes, “Armenian highlands are in the middle of the three West Asia highlands. They are situated mainly in Turkey… From a geological and structural standpoint, they are part of the Mediterranean Alpine zone”\(^{168}\).

Proceeding from objective information that Armenians are not autochthons, but allochthons, or newcomers, in the Caucasus, let’s point to the following. They appeared in Asia Minor, especially in the South Caucasus, as a result of political, military and migration circumstances. In addition to the above evidence which is confirmed by Armenian, Russian and western authors, let’s also refer to the following.

First, notorious Armenian writer and journalist Zori Balayan wrote of an Armenian disease. “There are around 4,000 ethnicities and peoples in the world, and only Armenians have their own ‘disease’”\(^{169}\). The Big Medical Encyclopedia provides the following


\(^{166}\) Ditto. P. 202.


definition of the “Armenian disease”\textsuperscript{170}. \textbf{“A periodic disease”:} (Syn.: Armenian Syndrome, Janeway-Mothenal Paroxysmal Syndrome, Periodic Peritonitis Syndrome, the Reiman Syndrome, the Siegel-Cattan-Mamou Syndrome, the Familial Mediterranean fever) is a rare and inherited disease characterized by recurrent serositis and frequent amyloidosis. The disease was first described in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, but S. Siegal expounded and classified its clinical features only in 1949, drawing attention to the ethnic selectivity and hereditary nature of the pathology… \textbf{In most instances, the disease affects persons whose ancestors lived in the Mediterranean basin, e.g. Armenians, Jews (mostly Sephardic Jews), Arabs and only 6 per cent among other ethnicities} (highlighted by myself – M.M.)… Persons affected by the disease are supposed to have congenital metabolic and enzymatic disorders that leads to abnormalities in immune and endocrine systems, protein synthesis and proteolysis… Abnormalities of cellular metabolism are evidenced by the development of amyloidosis irrespective of the seriousness of the disease. This attests to the genetic nature of the disease… The disease is diagnosed on the basis of the following criteria: 1) first symptoms of the disease at a child or adolescent age, mainly among certain ethnic groups; 2) frequent detection of the disease among relatives; 3) occasional short and typical relapses (abdominal, thoracal, articular, feverish) not caused by specific reasons; 4) frequent amyloidosis of kidneys. Laboratory indices are largely non-specific and indicate the degree of inflammatory response or the degree of kidney insufficiency… \textbf{The prognosis} for survival is favorable. The occurrence of the disease does not usually hamper physical or mental development or marriage. Very frequent relapses of the disease may lead to physical incapacity, while patients with amyloidosis (often in persons below 40) may have kidney insufficiency and disability”.

\begin{flushright}
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where did the Armenian ethnicity emerge?

We have described the Armenian disease deliberately to help the reader understand where Armenian ancestors actually came from. The description of the disease, as well as Z. Balayan’s dubious pride over the Armenian “disease”, confirm that the Armenian writer’s ancestors are not autochthons of the Caucasus. On the contrary, it is indicated again that the homeland of Armenian ancestors is the Mediterranean Europe, the historical area of Thrace in the Balkans, from where they migrated to Asia. It should also be noted that “according to Indo-European linguistics, the Armenian language represents an independent branch in the family of Indo-European (Aryan) languages”\(^{171}\). At the same time, as M. Abegyan writes, “the Armenian language is not quite Indo-European. It is transitory from the family of Japhetic languages to the European system”\(^{172}\). In other words, the place of the Armenian language in the linguistic family has not been determined up to now. This was also confirmed by N. Adonts, who wrote 100 years ago, “Developing in ethnically diverse surroundings, the language could not preserve its purity; indeed, the Armenian language is such a complex organism that it can still hardly be analyzed linguistically”\(^{173}\).

Second. According to Armenian scholars, the Armenian people emerged on Armenian highlands, i.e. in the east of Asia Minor, “the country of Hayas” “as a result of gradual blending of ancient tribes and unions living there”\(^{174}\). Further, “the Armenian people inherited the name of Hay from the tribal union of Hayas, and the territory they occupied became known as Hayk,

\(^{171}\) M. Abegyan, History of ancient Armenian literature. P. 11.

\(^{172}\) Ditto.


A. Adonts notes: “The blending of two ethnic elements led to the formation of a nucleus of the Armenian ethnicity which was further expanded due to the influx of ethnic streams of neighboring states. Due to the dual nucleus, Armenians were referred to in two ways: “hai at home and armeni-us (arminiya in Darius’ inscription) abroad. Accordingly, ancient Armenian legends of MosesKhorenatsialso point to these two eponyms—haik and armen-ak. Armenian scholars also talk of the following: a tribal union of Hayas was situated in the upper reaches of the Euphrates; the tribes settled there were Indo-European Armenian-speaking and were called mushku and urumu in Assyrian cuneiforms, arims—in Greek records and further—armens. Thus, above is the data from first sources and experts on Armenia. It confirms that the Armenian ethnicity emerged outside the Caucasus, in Asia Minor. Accordingly, there is a theory that Armenian ancestors were a Thracian tribe which subsequently moved to Asia Minor. The first territory in the region which became known as “Armenia” is a mountain country where the Euphrates and the Tigris originate. From here they subsequently moved into the valley of the Aras, then into the valley of the Kura river, i.e. to the Caucasus.

Third. M. Abegyan writes: “The Armenian language is of Indo-European origin only in part. Many words, particles and grammatical forms which have not been explained yet may be linked to the tribes that did not speak Indo-European languages.” In particular, the author implies the tribes of Hittites, Luwians, Hurrians and Urartians, which inhabited Asia Minor and influenced not

only the Armenian language but also the formation of the Armenian ethnicity. M. Abegyan also notes that Armenian culture was also influenced by its neighbors. Armenians adopted a lot from them, including the art of war, lifestyle, social life, crafts, trade, religion, flora and Armenian onomastics.

• This influence “is primarily noticeable in the Armenian language which has so many completely Armenianized Persian words adopted mainly in the Parthian epoch (3rd century B.C. – 3rd century A.D. – M.M.) and similar to Pehlevi words (3rd – 6th centuries – M.M.). For what, the Armenian language was once attributed to the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages. There are numerous proper names; approximately 800 word roots are borrowed from Persian... Religious beliefs and the cult of ancient Armenians were also considerably affected by Persian”\(^{179}\).

• “simultaneously with the Iranians, Armenians established relations in the south with the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Assyria – the Aramaics which were described as Syrians after Christianization of the region. Armenians were influenced by their higher culture... As a result, the Armenians adopted many good things from the Syrians. The Syriac language had an impact on the Armenian, albeit less than Persian. There are many Syrian words in Armenian which have now been Armenianized ... Syrians, too, have had an impact on Armenian religion”\(^{180}\).

• Armenian expert on Syria G. Melkonyan also points to the impact of Syrian culture on Armenians of Asia Minor, in particular the adopted Syriac terms, numerous translations of different works from Syriac into ancient Armenian\(^{181}\).

• It would be worth mentioning regarding the connection be-

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tween Syrians and Armenians that latter adopted Christianity from the former in the 4th century; before the Armenian alphabet, Armenians used the Syriac script; education in Armenian schools was conducted in Syriac; the Peshitta, Syriac version of the Bible, was popular; there were Syrians among Armenian religious hierarchs, e.g. Barkisho (426-429)\textsuperscript{182}. 

**Fourth.** Armenian scholars of the 20th century adhered to the following tendency. Whereas at the dawn of the century they claimed that Armenian ancestors had come to Asia from Europe, afterwards they referred to Asia Minor as a place where the Armenian ethnicity emerged. At the end of the 20th century, scholars already said Armenians were natives of the Caucasus. In other words, as Armenians moved from eastwards, experts on Armenia revised the origin of the Armenians.

**Fifth.** Proceeding from the above, it is quite clear why Armenian scholars talk of a “history of the Armenian people” as an ethnicity, not the “history of Armenia” as a territory. Georgian historians write about the “history of Georgia”, i.e. a territory on which Georgian forefathers used to live; Azerbaijani historians write about the “history of Azerbaijan”, i.e. a place where their ancestors lived. In other words, Armenian neighbors in the South Caucasus are studying not only their past, but also the history of the ethnic territory in which their forefathers lived. Armenians currently inhabit an “Armenian geographic space”, which experts on Armenia describe as “Eastern Armenia”. However, it would be fair to call it “Caucasian Armenia” where Armenians appeared in the wake of military and political developments of 19th – early 20th centuries.

**Sixth.** No other ethnicity has ever had so many definitions for its territory. Armenians did not and could not have lands outside Thrace; this is why they moved from one place to another so easily; without knowing where to settle down, they were always on the move and always changed the name of the place, considering it their another “homeland”. However, the Armenians were not

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\textsuperscript{182} Orthodox Encyclopedia. Vol. III. P. 352.
satisfied with that. This is how many “Armenian states” appeared on “the historical maps of Armenia”: “Great Armenia” (886-1045) with the capital in Yerazgavors (Shirakavan), Kars and Ani. Later, “this kingdom was divided into the kingdom of Vaspurakan with

the capital in Van, the kingdom of Kars or Vanand with the capital in Kars, the Kingdom of Lori or Tashir-Dzoraget with the capital in Shamshvilde, the Kingdom of Syunik with the capital in Sisyan and Kapan, the kingdom of Parisos with the capital in Parisos, and princedom of Taron.183 Thus, in the 9th-11th centuries there were six Armenian states.

Also unique is the definition of “Armenia outside Armenia”184, which refers to Armenians in Byzantine, the Cilician Armenian state, Armenian settlements, i.e. the Diaspora that started forming in the 4th century following first division of Armenia. “The specific conditions emerging in Armenia under foreign rule made Armenians leave their homeland and seek refuge away from home, within the Byzantine empire. The exodus to Byzantium began after the first division of Armenia (387) and intensified under the Arabs and Seljuks. Besides emigration, there were also overt and covert deportation of the Armenians”185. Nonetheless, Armenians settled down everywhere. Even in Byzantium, where they always seemed alien, they achieved a lot.186 The same was subsequently observed in the Ottoman and Russian Empires.


184 G. Sarkisyan, K. Khudaverdyan, K. Yuzbashyan, Ancestry of Hayk. Essay on history and culture of Armenia from ancient times to the formation of the Third Republic. Ch. IX.


The above information gives rise to yet another question: why have Armenians migrated from one place to another for centuries? The historical reality whereby the Armenian ethnicity existed without a state has led to the appearance of the Armenian Diaspora where most Armenians have lived since the 4th century. “Travelling” from Thrace in Europe to Asia in the East, Armenian ancestors experienced the geopolitical plans of regional superpowers, communicated with different peoples, languages and cultures. Their earliest historical recollections are related to Hellas and Rome, which treated Armenians like other non-Greeks and non-Romans. In particular, the standard formula that “Armenia is a friend and ally of the Romans” is evidence of their dependence during their stay in Asia Minor. The time of Byzantium and the Sasanids proved more severe: in 387 these superpowers divided the Armenian state in Asia Minor between themselves. In 591, the second division of the newly-established Armenian kingdom in Asia Minor occurred. In 1045, Byzantium liquidated the Armenian kingdom restored in the 9th century. In 1080-1375, there was a Principedom of Cilicia in Asia Minor, which was liquidated by the Mamelukes which ruled Egypt and Syria (1250-1517). Between then and 1918, i.e. for over 500 years, there was no Armenian state.


Under such circumstances, defined as *interregnum*, Armenians appeal to their Catholicos for moral and political support. As a result, on orders from the latter there appear researches describing Armenians wandering in Asia Minor and numerous “Armenias”. This baton is picked up by experts on Armenia dwelling on a multitude of “Armenias” depending on the epoch being and the social order.

Thus, the beginning of the Armenian migration and the formation of the Armenian Diaspora date back to the 4th century. There were two stages of mass migration of Armenians. The *first* stage occurred after the 4th century: the time when the Diaspora emerged and first deportation organized by Byzantium took place. The *second* stage was the mass migration of Ottoman and Iranian Armenians organized by the Russian Empire. Armenians were settled in the South Caucasus, mainly Northern Azerbaijan, where an Armenian area was established specifically for them in 1828. As a result, the ethno-geographic and confessional situation in the region underwent dramatic change (See Table):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Armenians before the first third of the 19th century</th>
<th>Number of Armenians after the first third of the 19th century</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>2,560,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(150,000 in present-day Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>70,000 (estimated)</td>
<td>30,000 (estimated)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(200,000 in the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran, mainly Southern Azerbaijan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Almost no Armenians</td>
<td>1,300,000,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mainly in Northern Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, a *non-Caucasian* element appeared in the ethno-demographic structure of the Caucasus. However, back in the 18th-19th centuries the Caucasus region and its autochthons had also seen
tribes and peoples attracted by its natural wealth, the important commercial and transit roads linking north with south and east with west. For example, the Huns, Bulgars, Sabirs, Kurds, Tats and Arabs settled down here in the early middle ages. Later the Seljuks, Mongols, Tatars, Kalmyks and Russians appeared. The region's ethnic map permanently changed, which was one of the geopolitical consequences of the transforming world. The tendency remained until the 19th century. In the early 19th century separatist Germans from the Kingdom of Württemberg moved to the Caucasus with the permission of Russian Emperor Alexander I. However, there were much more Armenians than any other settlers. This is confirmed by the data as of the early 20th century. Among migrants to the Caucasus, there were 148,970 Kurds, including 148,906 in the South Caucasus, Jews constituted 87,784 and 77,226 respectively; Europeans 169,931 and 93,476; Armenians – 1,713,169 and 1,659,063. Specifically in the Northern Azerbaijan, Germans numbered 159,900 people or 0.4 per cent of the total population, Russians 249,779 or 6.65 per cent, Kurds 114,001 or 3.03 per cent, Armenians 1,208,615 or 32.8 per cent, i.e. a third of all residents of the country.

Therefore, it was Armenians who formed the majority of the foreign component, i.e. the core of Russia’s migration program. And it was them who became the Russian Empire’s satellite factor in the Caucasus. As a result, the rights of autochthons, primarily Azerbaijanis who lost part of their territory, were infringed upon. The number of local Muslims fell, while the ethno-demographic situation changed.

**CONCLUSION**

The above confirms the well-known postulate that inter-state and ethnic relations fall under the category of the most topical problems of geopolitics. This conclusion applies to both remote past and the present.

The said theory also holds true for the Caucasus, which is at the centre of geo-strategic attention of many powerful political players of the modern world. The world’s problems include 200-year relations in the “Armenia-Russia-Caucasus” triangle. The North and South Caucasus, i.e. Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are important components of this multi-functional figure. However, the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Javakheti and Borchali persistently and incessantly discussed by the Armenians stand out the most. Under such circumstances, the Armenian triad has been using, since the 19th century, everything it possibly can and relying on those contributing to Armenianism in one way or another. It is not by chance that Russian government official K. Zubarev said in his *Notes on the Karabakh Province*: “Armenian migration to our provinces is one of the immortal feats in the war with Persia (in 1826-1828. – M.M.). Armenians are the most faithful people of the region. I would even say that they are the
most honest, at least, among common people. Armenians from Persia are noted for diligence, most of them are craftsmen, which is quite useful and rare in the Caucasus”¹⁹⁵. Ironically enough, it is thanks to the “Church-party-Diaspora” triad that the role of Armenians in the Caucasus became increasingly important, especially in the “Armenians-Russia-Caucasus” triangle.

As ancient people said, every nation deserves its own fate. Indeed, every nation has its own destiny, history, i.e. the past, the present and the future. All this is the result of the road passed, goals and achievements. At the same time, it is also the result of a people’s characteristics: its material and spiritual culture, historical development, self-identification and mentality, religion and self-consciousness. It is the indicator of the level of national cause and national ideology. Not only the nature of a people, but also its relations with other nations, its state and habitat are also very important. Other features are quite important too, because every people combines traits that distinguish it from others, confirming the concept that every nation is unique, inimitable and original.

Experts on Armenia use the definition of “Armenians who have stayed in their historical homeland”. They do not accept Thrace in the Balkans, i.e. in Europe, as homeland. They consider some virtual “Armenia” a homeland and refer to it every time it is required for a specific political aim, not scientific. This is why there is a great number of “Armenias”. This is why experts on Armenia have come to the conclusion that “a large part of Armenian history

took place in the conditions of foreign rule”\textsuperscript{196}. This feature of the Armenian ethnicity may have left a mark on the destiny, nature, mentality and other features of an “ethnicity”.

\textsuperscript{196} G. Sarkisyan, K. Khudaverdyan, K. Yuzbashyan, Ancestry of Hayk. Essay on history and culture of Armenia from ancient times to the formation of the Third Republic. P. 5.
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Musa MARJANLI

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